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Abstract
This paper examines sources of gender pay disparity and the factors
that contribute to this pay gap. Many researchers question the role
of discrimination and instead attribute the residual pay gap to gender
diﬀerences in preferences. The main issue considered in this paper is
whether gender diﬀerences in choices, especially with respect to the
family and household, are indeed responsible for the gender pay gap,
or whether discrimination plays a role. On balance, the evidence indicates that sex discrimination remains a possible explanation of the
unexplained gender pay gap. This is consistent with the continuing
high proﬁle sex discrimination litigation suggestive of on-going inferior
treatment on the basis of sex.

1
Introduction

Women have made huge advances relative to men in labor force participation, occupational status, and educational attainment. Women
now comprise the majority of college students and half of the students
in law school and medical school. Yet women continue to earn less
than men, and while the gender pay gap has narrowed, a substantial
gap remains. This survey article examines sources of this pay disparity
and the factors that contribute to women’s relative advancement over
time. Whether sex discrimination plays a role in the persistent gender pay gap is a topic of considerable debate in academic research as
well as in the workplace. Although concerns over discrimination pervaded the debate over sex disparities in pay throughout the 1970s and
1980s, many observers now deny the possibility of discrimination and
instead attribute the residual pay gap to gender diﬀerences in preferences, especially with respect to balancing market work with family
responsibilities. The evidence presented in this survey shows that sex
discrimination should not be dismissed as a source of the unexplained
gender pay gap.
Arguments that pay gaps arise from choice seem sensible. Theoretical models of discrimination usually show the eventual elimination of
281
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discrimination due to market forces. And models of optimal allocation
of time within a household imply that gender diﬀerences in household
and child-related responsibilities will lead men and women to make different choices with respect to the labor market and home, and these
choices may result in a gender pay gap. Diﬀerences in anticipated and
actual labor market commitment and in preferences will lead to gender diﬀerences in investment in market-related characteristics, such
as education and training, and lesser amounts of market capital will
result in lower earnings. Some studies show that the presence of children has a negative eﬀect on women’s earnings. Women perform a
disproportionate share of housework, and time spent on housework has
been shown to have a direct negative impact on wages. Diﬀerences in
household responsibilities and preferences may also aﬀect other dimensions of labor market outcomes. For instance, women who are primarily
responsible for the household may accept employment in jobs that are
more compatible with household responsibilities, such as those closer to
home, with more ﬂexible work schedules, oﬀering generous maternity
leave policies, or with lower levels of injury or fatality job risk. Compensating diﬀerentials associated with job characteristics may thereby
aﬀect the pay gap.
Hence, it is easy to understand the appeal of choice-based explanations of the gender pay gap. But the empirical evidence is not clear cut.
By deﬁnition, labor market discrimination is characterized by unequal
treatment of equally productive persons in a way that is related to
observable characteristics such as sex, race, or ethnicity. The bulk of
the literature on sex disparities in the labor market examines whether
an unexplained pay disparity remains after controlling for individual
characteristics that are expected to inﬂuence earnings, with control
variables serving as proxies for productivity. Thus, controlling for characteristics that derive from choices of market work relative to family should eliminate an unexplained pay gap. The literature, however,
documents gender disparities in pay that persist even with extensive
controls for education, actual work experience, training, family characteristics, and so on. Unexplained disparities are often interpreted as
due to discrimination. But because there is always the possibility that
some unmeasured factor is actually responsible for any unexplained pay
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disparity, such evidence on the existence or persistence of discrimination is not conclusive.
The main issue considered in this paper is whether gender diﬀerences in choices, especially with respect to the family and household,
are indeed responsible for the gender pay gap, or whether discrimination plays a role. I begin Section 2 by documenting trends showing
considerable convergence of men and women with respect to labor force
participation, earnings, and occupational distribution. Sections 3 and 4
discuss measurement and empirical evidence on the unexplained gender pay gap and trends in occupational segregation, respectively. Even
with extensive controls for characteristics that aﬀect earnings, a considerable unexplained pay gap remains, and occupational crowding arising
from segregation into occupations by sex is unlikely to be an important
explanation of the gender pay gap.
Section 5 discusses the role of gender diﬀerences in turnover in
explaining the pay gap. Notably, there is little diﬀerence between men
and women in quit rates or in average job tenure. The evidence summarized in this section shows that gender diﬀerences in turnover do
not explain the gender pay disparity. Section 6 describes evidence on
the impact of family and housework on pay. While there is some evidence that the presence of children lowers women’s earnings, overall the evidence is mixed, and any eﬀect varies by education and
over the life cycle. There is more consistent support for a negative
eﬀect of housework time on earnings. However, contrary to popular
belief, family and housework are not the major cause of the gender
pay gap.
Section 7 looks at whether compensating diﬀerentials for attractive working conditions, such as ﬂexible work schedules and safer
jobs, explains the gap. Although an appealing explanation, compensating diﬀerentials are not responsible for the gender pay gap.
Section 8 looks at the role of educational choices, particularly with
respect to college major. While there is less segregation by sex in
college major now than earlier, controlling for college major does
not eliminate the gender pay gap except among new college graduates. Section 9 discusses studies that control for actual productivity, as this approach avoids the omitted-productivity-factor criticism
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levied at wage equation studies. These studies show direct evidence of
discrimination.
On balance, the evidence indicates that sex discrimination remains
a possible explanation of the unexplained gender pay gap. This is consistent with the continuing high-proﬁle sex discrimination litigation
suggestive of ongoing inferior treatment on the basis of sex.

2
Background on Labor Force Participation,
Earnings, and Occupation

This section provides statistics on trends in the labor market. The most
visible outcomes of market work are labor force participation, earnings,
and occupation. As the tables provided here demonstrate, female/male
diﬀerences have lessened over time, although a substantial gap in pay
remains.
Table 2.1 provides evidence on labor force participation in selected
years over the period 1970–2004. Perhaps the most notable change in
the labor market over the past 35 years is the dramatic increase in the
female labor force participation rate, with the less dramatic but steady
decline in the male labor force participation rate. In 1970, women were
only slightly more than half as likely as men to be employed or seeking
employment. By 2004, the labor force participation rate of women was
81 percent of men’s. Women now comprise over 46 percent of the total
employed workforce.
Table 2.2 reports median weekly earnings of female and male fulltime wage and salary workers in selected years. In 1979, the ratio of
female to male earnings was 62.3 percent. By 2004, a mere 25 years
later, women’s earnings are 80 percent of men’s.
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Table 2.1 Labor force participation rates, selected years 1970–2004.

Female
Male
F/M %

1970

1980

1990

2000

2004

43.3
79.7
54.3

51.5
77.4
66.5

57.5
76.4
75.3

59.9
74.8
80.1

59.2
73.3
80.8

Note: Noninstitutional population age 16 years and over, annual averages.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Women in the Labor Force: A Databook (2005). Adapted
from Table 2.
Table 2.2 Median usual weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers in current
dollars, selected years 1979–2004.

Female
Male
F/M %

1979

1980

1990

2000

2004

182
292
62.3

201
313
64.2

346
481
71.9

493
641
76.9

573
713
80.4

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Women in the Labor Force: A Databook (2005). Adapted
from Table 16.

In part, wage disparities arise from diﬀerences in occupation.
Table 2.3 provides an overview of trends in occupation by gender based
on broad occupational categories. In 1983, women comprised nearly
44 percent of total employment. The female share of total employment rose slightly to nearly 47 percent by 2002. There are clear diﬀerences in broad occupation, with women underrepresented in blue-collar
jobs. The largest increase in female share of occupational employment
between 1983 and 2002 occurred in managerial and professional specialty occupations. By 2002, slightly over half of those employed in
managerial and professional specialty occupations were women, up from
41 percent in 1983. The female share of employment in technical, sales,
administrative support, and service occupations remained fairly steady,
with female employees comprising 60 percent or more of the workers in
these occupations.
While the inﬂux of women into managerial and professional specialty occupations would seem to contribute to the narrowing of the
gender pay gap, examination of narrower occupation categories shows
that women generally fare worse relative to men within these occupations. Based on full-time wage and salary workers in 2004, Table 2.4
reports employment, percent female, male median weekly earnings, and
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Table 2.3 Percent female in major occupation, 1983 and 2002.
1983

Total, 16 years and over
Managerial and
professional specialty
Technical, sales, and
administrative support
Service occupations
Precision production,
craft, and repair
Operators, fabricators,
and laborers
Farming, forestry, and
ﬁshing

2002

Number in
occupation
(thousands)
100,834
23,592

Percent
female
43.7
40.9

Number in
occupation
(thousands)
136,485
42,482

Percent
female
46.6
50.5

31,265

64.6

38,947

63.4

13,857
12,328

60.1
8.1

19,219
14,660

59.9
8.2

16,091

26.6

17,697

22.7

3,700

16.0

3,480

20.6

Note: The years 1983 and 2002 are used to compare occupations because occupational categories were revised in 2003. Due to the revision, these categories do not directly correspond
to categories used to compare female to male earnings reported in Table 4.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Women in the Labor Force: A Databook (2005). Adapted
from Table 10.

female median earnings as a percentage of male median earnings. Note
the considerable variation in median pay among occupations. Managerial and professional occupations are generally the highest paying. But
we also see that in many of the managerial and professional occupations, the female to male ratio is actually lower than the overall female
to male earnings ratio of 80.4 percent. For example, among managers,
women’s earnings are 72 percent of men’s. In none of these occupational groups do women’s earnings exceed even 90 percent of men’s
earnings. Women’s earnings are closest to men’s in low-paying occupations, such as healthcare support, food preparation and serving related,
oﬃce and administrative support, and farming, ﬁshing, and forestry.
Women employed in installation, maintenance, and repair occupations
have earnings that are 86.4 percent of men’s, but women comprise only
4.4 percent of employment in these occupations.1
1 It

is of interest to note that in 2004, female full-time wage and salary workers have higher
median weekly earnings than men in seven narrowly deﬁned (three-digit) occupations.
These occupations and the ratio of female to male earnings are as follows: Food preparation
workers, 101.3; dining room and cafeteria attendants and bartender helpers, 109.2; bill and
account collectors, 101.9; reservation and transportation ticket agents and travel clerks,

101,224
10,221
4,558
2,793
2,500
1,073
1,848
1,111
5,941
1,426
4,680
1,985
2,509
3,863
3,436
1,969
9,984
14,966
718
6,232
4,330
8,478
6,604

43.7
39.1
57.3
27.1
13.2
39.7
58.6
54.3
71.9
43.3
74.1
88.4
18.8
49.4
35.2
72.7
44.3
74.3
18.5
2.0
4.4
28.9
12.7

713
1,215
1,007
1,155
1,139
1,012
766
1,561
956
862
1,062
453
733
384
412
500
747
587
367
606
707
597
549

Male median
weekly earnings

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Women in the Labor Force: A Databook (2005). Adapted from Table 18.

Total, 16 years and over
Management
Business and ﬁnancial operations
Computer and mathematical
Architecture and engineering
Life, physical, and social science
Community and social services
Legal
Education, training, and library
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media
Healthcare practitioner and technical
Healthcare support
Protective service
Food preparation and serving related
Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance
Personal care and service
Sales and related
Oﬃce and administrative support
Farming, ﬁshing, and forestry
Construction and extraction
Installation, maintenance, and repair
Production
Transportation and material moving

Total employed

Percent
female in
occupation

80.4
71.7
74.1
84.2
77.3
87.4
86.3
54.1
76.3
79.8
76.1
88.7
76.0
88.3
81.3
76.0
62.1
88.9
87.7
83.2
86.4
67.8
74.7

Female earnings as
percent of men’s

Table 2.4 Occupational employment, median usual weekly earnings, and female to male earnings ratio, full-time wage and salary workers,
2004 annual averages (numbers in thousands).
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Table 2.4 also demonstrates how broad occupational categories
mask considerable sorting by sex within broad occupational category.
Although about half of those employed in managerial and professional
specialty occupations are female, only 27 percent of those employed
in computer and mathematical occupations are female, as are only
13 percent of those in architecture and engineering occupations. But
57 percent of those employed in business and ﬁnancial operations occupations are female, as are 72 percent of those in education, training,
and library occupations, 88 percent of those employed in healthcare
support, and 74 percent of those in oﬃce and administrative support
occupations.

102.0; postal service clerks, 102.2; computer operators, 100.9; mail clerks and mail machine
operators except postal service, 110.6. These seven occupations employ 1.9 percent of the
total employment of full-time wage and salary workers and therefore have little impact on
the overall female to male ratio.

3
Measuring Pay Disparities

Pay disparities can arise from diﬀerences in work-related characteristics
as well as from diﬀerential treatment by the market of these characteristics. Earnings diﬀerences due to diﬀerences in average characteristics
are referred to as “explained,” and diﬀerences in returns to characteristics are “unexplained.” The portion unexplained by individual characteristics is frequently interpreted as a measure of discrimination.

3.1

Oaxaca–Blinder Decomposition Method

To estimate the amount of any pay disparity due to diﬀerences in
returns to levels of characteristics as well as due to diﬀerent returns
to characteristics, the decomposition method of Oaxaca (1973) and
Blinder (1973) is widely used. Their decomposition procedure is performed by estimating log wage equations separately for male and female
workers. The log wage equations for men and women can be written as
ln wm = Xm bm ,

(3.1)

ln wf = Xf bf ,

(3.2)

where ln wm and ln wf are the average log wages for men and women,
respectively, Xm and Xf are vectors of average values of the explanatory
290
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variables, and bm and bf are the vectors of estimated coeﬃcients from
the log wage Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2).
Subtracting (3.2) from (3.1) yields
ln wm − ln wf = Xm bm − Xf bf .

(3.3)

We can now rearrange Eq. (3.3) in two equivalent ways. By adding
and subtracting to Eq. (3.3) the term Xf bm , and grouping the terms,
we can rewrite Eq. (3.3) as
ln wm − ln wf = (Xm − Xf )bm + Xf (bm − bf ).

(3.4)

By adding and subtracting Xm bf to Eq. (3.3), the log wage gap can
alternatively be written as
ln wm − ln wf = (Xm − Xf )bf + Xm (bm − bf ).

(3.5)

Equations (3.4) and (3.5) decompose the total log wage gap ln wm −
ln wf into two parts. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of Eqs. (3.4)
and (3.5) represents the component of the log wage gap arising from
gender diﬀerence in average characteristics (Xm − Xf ) where diﬀerences in these characteristics are “valued” using the male regression
coeﬃcients in Eq. (3.4) and using the female coeﬃcients in Eq. (3.5).
The second term on the right-hand side in each equation is the portion of the log wage gap due to diﬀerences in the wage structure faced
by males and females. This component is not explained by diﬀerences
in average characteristics and is thereby frequently interpreted as a
measure of discrimination.
It is clear that the decompositions diﬀer only in the choice of weights
on the disparities (Xm − Xf ) and (bm − bf ). Equation (3.4) assumes
that the male wage structure is the nondiscriminatory structure, while
Eq. (3.5) assumes that the female wage structure is the nondiscriminatory structure. The values can diﬀer considerably based on which wage
structure is assumed to be the nondiscriminatory structure.
Of course, neither the current wage structure faced by females or by
males may be the structure that would be observed in the absence of
discrimination. A generalized decomposition that includes both (3.4)
and (3.5) as special cases is
ln wm − ln wf = (Xm − Xf )b + [Xm (bm − b) − Xf (bf − b)],

(3.6)
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where b is the coeﬃcients in the no-discrimination wage structure
(Neumark, 1988). If in the absence of discrimination the male wage
structure would prevail, b = bm , and Eq. (3.6) reduces to Eq. (3.4).
Similarly, if in the absence of discrimination the female wage structure would prevail, Eq. (3.6) reduces to Eq. (3.5). The actual form of
the no-discrimination wage structure depends on the form of employers’ discriminatory behavior. One plausible possibility is suggested by
Neumark (1988), who shows that if employers care only about the relative proportion of male and female workers, then the no-discrimination
structure is represented by the coeﬃcients derived from regressions
pooling males and females.
For any given raw wage gap, typically less than half of the wage
gap is explained by diﬀerences in characteristics. For example, using
Current Population Survey (CPS) data for 1979 and 1995 and controlling for education, experience, personal characteristics, city and region,
occupation, industry, government employment, and part-time status,
Altonji and Blank (1999) ﬁnd that only about 27 percent of the gender wage gap in each year is explained by diﬀerences in characteristics.
Also using CPS data, Boraas and Rodgers (2003) estimate a similar
speciﬁcation augmented by percent female in occupation. They report
that only 39 percent of the gender pay gap is explained in 1999, controlling for percent female, schooling, potential experience, region, SMSA
size, minority status, part-time employment, marital status, union, government employment, and industry. The explained share is somewhat
higher in 1989 and 1992 based on the same speciﬁcation, with the
explained share 58 percent in 1989 and 53 percent in 1992.
Because these decompositions and measures of discrimination are
widely reported, it is worthwhile to keep in mind some of the limitations. A key criticism is that productivity measures are only partially
accounted for, so any unexplained disparity can always be attributed
to something not included in the regression. If men fare better on
the omitted characteristics, then the pay gap is overstated. Related
to this point is the accuracy of measured human capital. In particular, men average more years of labor market experience. Because
data on actual labor market experience is not available in some of the
larger, widely used data sets, such as the CPS, potential experience,
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equal to age minus years of education minus 5, is used as a proxy
for actual experience. This then overstates actual labor market experience for women. Finding diﬀerences in the returns to experience does
not necessarily say anything about discrimination but may instead
be reﬂective of diﬀerent location by gender on the actual wage–
experience proﬁle. A related point is that the same level of measured characteristics may represent diﬀerent amounts of human capital for men and women. In earlier periods, women’s expectations
to drop out of the labor force for family reasons would result in
lower actual investment in human capital, even for men and women
with the same measured years of education or experience (Polachek,
1975a, Sandell and Shapiro, 1980). If so, the return to human
capital characteristics could diﬀer by gender for nondiscriminatory
reasons.1
Although diﬀerences in characteristics are considered to be part of
the explained nondiscriminatory share of the wage gap, these characteristics may be inﬂuenced by discrimination. The presence and magnitude of discrimination therefore may be understated, as the control
variables themselves are inﬂuenced by discrimination.
There are also a number of modeling decisions that underlie the
wage regressions, and the estimates of discrimination tend to be inﬂuenced by speciﬁcation. While hourly wage is preferred, it is not always
available, and regressions using annual salary or weekly salary conﬂate
labor supply with earnings. It was the norm for a number of years following Heckman (1979) to correct for selection into the labor force for
women. However, identifying the wage equation is almost always problematic, as it is unusual to have valid instruments that explain labor
force participation but do not themselves inﬂuence wages.2 Misspeciﬁcation can generate large biases in estimates (Manski, 1989). Ashraf
1 While

the human capital literature stresses that women’s expectations to drop out of the
labor market lead to lesser market investments and a lower return to these investments,
Hersch and Reagan (1997) show that if men and women diﬀer only in their expected time
in the labor market, eﬃcient wage–tenure proﬁles are steeper for women than men to
induce optimal eﬀort. A number of empirical studies, reviewed in Hersch and Reagan, ﬁnd
a steeper wage–tenure proﬁle for women.
2 Technically the wage equation is identiﬁed by functional form but such results are less
persuasive as they do not derive from a theoretical basis.
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(1996) ﬁnds that the selectivity coeﬃcient was signiﬁcant in only 1 of
16 regressions estimated for separate years, suggesting that selection is
random after controlling for observables. Whether to control for occupation, industry, job training, college major, and so forth, is debatable, as such outcomes themselves are almost certainly inﬂuenced by
(actual or potential) discrimination. Studies with extensive controls
for characteristics highly correlated with gender unsurprisingly greatly
reduce or eliminate the wage gap. The construction of the sample likewise strongly inﬂuences whether a discriminatory gap is measured,
with the smallest gaps (or no gap) measured among new entrants (as
for lawyers in Hersch, 2003) or those not married (Fishback and Terza,
1989).
A recent example that demonstrates the interpretation problem
inherent in the decomposition approach to measuring discrimination
is by O’Neill and O’Neill (2005). O’Neill and O’Neill use data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). The NLSY79
is a nationally representative survey of young men and women who were
born during 1957–1964, and are 14–22 years old when ﬁrst interviewed
in 1979. O’Neill and O’Neill’s analysis leaves a considerable unexplained
gap even controlling for AFQT, education, and actual work history,
including proportion of work time that was part time, indicators for
whether ﬁrst birth was before age 30 years or at least age 30 years, and
whether the women ever had a spell outside of the labor force due to
family responsibilities, as well as for percent female in the occupation,
measures of occupational characteristics derived from the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles (DOT) and computer use derived from CPS
supplements.
Despite unusually extensive and seemingly comprehensive controls
for choice, O’Neill and O’Neill conclude that the unexplained gap is
due to diﬀerence in choices about amount of time and energy devoted
to a career, as indicated by the greater proportion of women who had
part-time work and were employed in the nonproﬁt sector (even though
the gap remains when these controls are included). They draw this conclusion in part from the regression restricted to childless, never-married
men and women, which shows that women have a higher wage without
adjustments, but that advantage disappears with controls and turns
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into an insigniﬁcant disadvantage of 2.7 percent.3 They conclude by
noting, “Our analysis indicates that women choose occupations and job
settings that are compatible with combining market and home work.
It would be diﬃcult to ﬁnd an explanation based on employer choice
that could explain the observed patterns.”
What O’Neill and O’Neill’s interpretation of their ﬁndings implies is
that no matter how comprehensive is the regression model, or how large
of an unexplained component remains, it is always possible to claim
that unobserved diﬀerences in choices are actually driving unexplained
pay disparities. Most researchers, however, ﬁnd the existence of wage
gaps that are not explained by gender diﬀerences in characteristics as
evidence in support of possible discrimination.

3.2

Wage Inequality and the Gender Pay Disparity

Wage inequality increased during the 1980s. Juhn et al. (1991, 1993),
advance the argument that this rising wage inequality is due to an
increase in the return to skills. They provide a decomposition that
adds two new components to the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition. Their
approach compares changes for a cohort over time to changes of cohorts
of the same age. Workers are assigned a percentile rank in the residual wage distribution. Changes in the residual diﬀerence between two
groups are then decomposed into changes in the diﬀerences in their
mean percentile ranks, which is interpreted as changes in the level
of unmeasured skill, and changes in the dispersion of the residual
wage distribution, which is interpreted as changes in the returns to
skill.4
Blau and Kahn (1997) employ this decomposition method to explain
the seeming paradox of widening wage inequality and a narrowing gender gap over the same period in the 1980s. The nature of the paradox is
3 As

we will see in our discussion of the inﬂuence of family status on earnings, the seeming
gender parity among never-married men and women derives from the very low pay for
never-married men, and the fact that most such individuals are at an early age and stage
of their work lives.
4 The importance of growing residual wage inequality in explaining most of the growth in
wage inequality is called into question by Lemieux (2006), who shows that the role of residual wage inequality is considerably diminished when controlling for changing composition
of the workforce and using data with a better measure of hourly wage.
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that women who have lower average observable labor market skills (e.g.,
work experience) and are located disproportionately in lower-paying
occupations and industries should have been made worse oﬀ by a wage
structure that increases the price of skills in higher skilled sectors. Blau
and Kahn’s analysis ﬁnds that but for the rising inequality and higher
rewards to skills, women would have made more progress in narrowing
the wage gap. Their estimates indicate that the gap would have been
5–6 percentage points lower if the wage structure had remained stable.
But the gap declined because women’s relative qualiﬁcations improved
(particularly with respect to experience and occupation) as well as due
to a narrowing of the unexplained component of the pay structure. This
narrowing may have happened because women also improved their relative level of unmeasured characteristics.5
Fortin and Lemieux (1998) also ﬁnd that women’s increased labor
market experience contributed to the narrowing of the gap, performing
a decomposition at each percentile of the wage distribution, as well
as considering that the changes in the relative position of women will
aﬀect the overall wage distribution (in contrast to Blau and Kahn who
assume that the male wage distribution will be unaﬀected by changes
in the relative position of women).
The residual gender wage gap can also be used to test theories of
discrimination. Theory implies that wage gaps should be smallest in
more competitive environments. Black and Brainerd (2004) examine
the impact of increased competition from trade in competitive and
concentrated industries. The wage gap in industries that are already
competitive should experience little decrease in the wage gap as trade
increases, while wage gaps in concentrated industries should narrow in
response to competitive pressures. Black and Brainerd use the import
share at the three-digit industry level as a measure of competition from
trade and classify an industry as concentrated if the four-ﬁrm concentration ratio was 0.40 or greater in 1977. The dependent variable is
calculated by ﬁrst regressing log wage on education, age, and nonwhite
using individual data from the March CPS over the periods 1977–1994,
5 Note,

however, that Suen (1997) demonstrates within a theoretical framework that this
interpretation is valid only if there is no discrimination.
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as well as from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups and the 1980 and
1990 Censuses. The change in the average residual gender wage gap at
the industry or MSA level is then regressed on whether an industry is
concentrated, import share, and the interaction of concentration with
import share. The ﬁndings indicate that increased competition from
trade reduces the residual wage gap in concentrated industries, thus
supporting the theory and indicating discrimination that may erode
over time in response to competitive pressures.

4
Occupational Segregation

There are long-standing disparities by gender in occupational distribution. Although there is more similarity now, as shown in Table 2.4,
many occupations disproportionately employ mainly men or women.
Women still comprise the vast majority of those employed as nurses,
pre-college teachers, social workers, and oﬃce and administrative support workers. Most engineers and construction workers are male. Substantial evidence shows an inverse relation between the proportion of
females in an occupation and wages for both men and women (e.g.,
Macpherson and Hirsch, 1995, Boraas and Rodgers, 2003). The importance of sex segregation in contributing to the gender pay gap cannot be
overstated. Groshen (1991) shows that most of the pay gap is explained
by sex segregation within occupations, industries, and establishments
rather than by wage diﬀerences.
Occupational segregation is predicted from several theories. In
Becker’s (1957) model of taste discrimination, at the extreme, discriminatory tastes of employers, coworkers, or customers result in ﬁrms segregated by sex.1 Bergmann’s (1974) model of occupational crowding
1 Neumark

(1988) modiﬁes the Becker model to allow employers to care about the relative
share of females to males, thus resulting in less than complete segregation.
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shows how segregation can lower women’s earnings by shifting to the
right the labor supply curve of women within the few occupations open
to women, thereby depressing wages within these occupations. Explanations of occupational segregation based on individual choice imply
that women anticipating weaker labor force attachment will choose
occupations in which the cost of intermittency is lower (Mincer and
Polachek, 1974).2 Breen and Garcı́a-Peñalosa (2002) model gender segregation arising in a Bayesian learning framework as prior beliefs about
the probability of success are transmitted from mother to daughter and
father to son. Preferences of earlier generations over gender roles will
inﬂuence current segregation. Statistical discrimination can in some
cases lead to segregation as employers make hiring decisions based on
predicted productivity of the group (Phelps, 1972, Arrow, 1973).
In this section, I discuss how occupational segregation is measured
and provide an overview of studies that examine the impact of occupational segregation on the gender pay gap.

4.1

Measuring Segregation

Occupational segregation is usually summarized by the index of dissimilarity, also called the “segregation index.” This is calculated as
I

D=

1
|pim − pif |,
2
i=1

where pim and pif represent the proportion of males (females) in the
labor force employed in occupation i, and I is the number of occupational categories. If women and men are proportionately represented
in every occupation, the index will have the value of zero. Complete
2 Polachek

(1981) demonstrates that women choose occupations with lower rates of atrophy,
where atrophy is measured as the coeﬃcient on home time in a wage regression. Thus
occupational segregation arises from human capital optimizing behavior. England (1982)
points out that both wage appreciation and depreciation will aﬀect occupational choice
and shows that wage growth is not aﬀected by the gender composition of occupations,
nor is gender composition of ﬁrst jobs correlated with eventual time in the labor market.
By examining the timing of labor market intermittency, Robst and VanGilder (2000)
show that gender composition of occupations does aﬀect depreciation rates for married
women, with depreciation rates lower for married women in female occupations than in
male occupations.
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segregation would result in an index value of 100. D represents the
proportion of women who would have to change occupations to achieve
an equal proportion of men and women across all occupations. The
value of the index depends on the detail of occupation classiﬁcations.
Based on the Census three-digit detailed occupations, the segregation index was around 65 for much of the 20th century but dropped
to around 50 over the period 1970–1990 (Reskin and Bielby, 2005).
Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) report a measure of D based on threedigit occupations that declined steadily from 68.5 in 1973–1974 to 54.6
in 1993.
Note that D (as well as other indices) has shortcomings as a measure of segregation. It is not invariant to the units of measurement
of occupation. Calculations using three-digit occupation codes indicate
greater segregation than calculations based on two-digit codes. These
indices are inﬂuenced by changes in labor force participation and by
trends in the economy, such as the movement from manufacturing to
services. The measures also depend on the ﬁneness with which occupations are reported. Historically blue-collar occupations held primarily
by men have been divided into narrower categories than have administrative support positions held primarily by women. Nonetheless such
measures are valuable in examining trends over time.

4.2

The Inﬂuence of Segregation on the Gender Pay
Disparity

There are two main approaches to examining the eﬀect of segregation
on earnings. The most common approach is to estimate a conventional
wage equation adding a control for percent female in occupation.
Because such aggregate statistics may mask substantial segregation at
the level of the ﬁrm or jobs within ﬁrms, the second approach looks at
sorting by sex into diﬀerent employers, and within employers, into different narrowly deﬁned jobs. The data demands of the latter approach
are far more extensive, and such studies are rarer (see e.g., Blau, 1977,
Groshen, 1991, Bayard et al., 2003). Regardless of the level of detail
of the data, an unexplained gender gap remains even with controls for
segregation.
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Wage equations controlling for percent female in occupation invariably ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient on percent female for both men and
women. One interpretation is that women face barriers to higher-paying
occupations, and that men who do not face such barriers but end up in
lower-paying female occupations are of inferior quality. Alternatively,
in the absence of gender discrimination, preferences for working conditions that warrant a compensating wage diﬀerential can also explain
why female occupations have lower pay.3
To explore these issues, Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) use information on gender composition and wages from the CPS over a 20-year
period (1973–1993) matched with data on occupational characteristics and working conditions from various CPS supplements as well as
the DOT. Macpherson and Hirsch’s standard wage equation speciﬁcation controls for education, potential experience, race, marital status,
full-time employment, public sector employment, metropolitan area,
region, industry, and occupation. The additional job characteristics in
their expanded wage equations include measures calculated from CPS
supplements of occupational tenure, part-time employment share, onthe-job training, and computer use, as well as measures from the DOT
of training requirements, strength, hazards, and physical and environmental working conditions. By using the panel nature of the CPS data,
Macpherson and Hirsch are able to net out individual ﬁxed eﬀects, and
by controlling for detailed job characteristics, they control in part for
working conditions. They ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on percent female
is about half the size in their diﬀerences speciﬁcation than in levels,
and that controlling for job characteristics lowers the eﬀect of percent
female to about one-third to two-thirds the original size relative to the
standard estimates in either levels or changes. They conclude that twothirds of the originally observed negative gender composition eﬀect is
due to unmeasured person-speciﬁc quality or preferences and measured
diﬀerences in job skills and characteristics.
Macpherson and Hirsch also examine how inclusion of percent
female in the occupation aﬀects the explained and unexplained
3 The

stratiﬁcation perspective of sociology would interpret the negative relation between
earnings and proportion female as resulting from cultural devaluation of predominantly
female activities.

302 Occupational Segregation
components of the gender wage gap over time. It is noteworthy that
even with these extensive controls and inclusion of percent female, much
less than half of the gender wage gap is explained by observable characteristics. For example, of the total log wage gap of 0.235 (26 percent)
in 1993, only 0.090, or 38 percent of the total wage gap, is explained by
these extensive control variables. Gender composition explains a relatively minor share of the gap, as do the additional job characteristics.
What we can infer from these results is that occupational crowding is
not likely to be an important explanation of the gender pay gap.

5
Turnover

Expected diﬀerences by gender in turnover are fundamental to most
explanations of the gender pay disparity. Choice-based explanations
stress the optimality of diﬀerent investments and occupations arising
from gender diﬀerences in labor market commitment. Models based on
statistical discrimination require that labor market characteristics of
women are less predictable than those of men. While women tend to
have less total experience, there is less evidence that women have lower
within-employer tenure than do men. Although women quit more often
for family-related reasons, men quit more often to move to another job.
Furthermore, men have higher layoﬀ rates (Blau and Kahn, 1981, Keith
and McWilliams, 1995).

5.1

Background Data

Table 5.1 reports statistics on median years of tenure over the
period 1983–2004 from various CPS supplements on tenure. Employees are asked how long they had worked continuously for their current
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Table 5.1 Median years of tenure with current employer for employed wage and salary
workers age 25 years and over, selected years.
January 1983

January 1991

February 1998

January 2004

4.2
5.9
71.2

4.3
5.4
79.6

4.4
4.9
89.8

4.7
5.1
92.2

Female
Male
F/M %

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Tenure in 2004. Adapted from Table 1, available at www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/tenure.pdf.
Table 5.2 Number of jobs held and percent of total weeks not in the labor force from age
18 to 38 years in 1978–2002.

Female
Male
F/M %

Average number of jobs
9.9
10.4
95.2

Percent of total weeks
not in the labor force
26.3
10.5
250.5

Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. Adapted from report at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/nlsoy.pdf, Tables 1 and 3.

employer.1 Table 5.1 shows that gender diﬀerences in tenure have not
been that dramatic, at least by 1983, and that only a small diﬀerence
remains to this date.
Table 5.2 reports statistics on number of jobs held and weeks not
worked calculated from the NLSY79. These statistics are based on the
sample of 7,724 individuals who responded to the 2002 wave of the
NLSY79 and are calculated using the period of their lives in which
they were age 18–38 years. Jobs are deﬁned as an uninterrupted period
of work with a particular employer. For self-employed workers, each
new job is deﬁned by the individual. Men average slightly more jobs
over this period, with both men and women averaging about 10 jobs
in this 20-year span at the beginning of their work histories. Women
spend slightly more than a quarter of their time not in the labor force,
while men spend only 10.5 percent of their time not in the labor force.
There are two lines of research related to turnover. First, does
turnover diﬀer by gender, controlling for job characteristics? Second,
does turnover aﬀect wages, and by what mechanism? Theory alone
1 Earlier

years of tenure data are not reported because the CPS question did not distinguish
whether individuals reported tenure on the job or tenure with the employer.
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does not yield clear predictions on whether men or women would have
higher quit rates. Search models assume that individuals maximize their
expected discounted lifetime income net of search costs. The decision to
quit to either unemployment or for a better job depends on the expected
wage oﬀer distribution, search costs, and the opportunity cost (equal
to current wage rate). For instance, if men have longer expected total
duration in the labor market, the gains from search and mobility will
be higher for men, increasing their quit rate. A related point is that if
women are constrained in their job search, for instance due to restricted
mobility for family reasons, then at the same wage rate women would
have lower quit rates than men.
The second question is how turnover aﬀects wages. There are two
main mechanisms with contradictory predictions. One mechanism is
the eﬀect of turnover on on-the-job training. In this framework, higher
(actual or expected) turnover would lead to lower investment in onthe-job training and lower wage growth. In contrast, search models
indicate that turnover results in better paying jobs and match quality. Since mobility is associated with higher wage rates, men’s greater
job-to-job mobility may lead to higher wages than does women’s jobto-nonemployment mobility. In a simple search model, gains from additional search depend on expected job duration. If men expect longer
duration on any job, then they will have a higher reservation wage.
Search costs may be higher for women who have less experience in the
labor market or who are responsible for childcare.
Table 5.3 summarizes some of the factors that aﬀect voluntary and
involuntary turnover, with predictions of whether men or women will
have higher rates for the speciﬁed reasons.

5.2

Does Turnover Diﬀer by Gender?

There are alternative empirical approaches used to test for gender
disparities in turnover. Some studies use probit to test whether the
individual quits his or her job during that period, or alternatively,
multinomial probit to allow for diﬀerent destinations (employment,
unemployment, not in labor force). Other studies use proportional hazard models to estimate parameters of models of duration to exit. Hazard
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Table 5.3 Predicted turnover diﬀerences by gender.

Reason

Explanation

Predicted
higher
turnover
rate for

Family

Bearing and raising children

Women

Family migration
decisions

Wives may quit jobs if higher paid husbands move
or wives may face geographic limits restricting
job mobility
Ability to learn match quality may depend on total
labor market experience, hence, women with less
labor market experience may make inferior
matches
Greater expected duration in labor market, greater
gains to search
Coworker discrimination may increase quits but
limited outside opportunities due to
discrimination will reduce quits
Cyclical industries will have higher layoﬀs

Uncertain

Matching and
information

Search
Discrimination

Layoﬀs
Speciﬁc investment
Search costs

Secondary earner

Greater speciﬁc investment, fewer alternative jobs
will pay more
May be higher for women if search ineﬃcient for
women due to lower labor market experience and
due to high opportunity cost of time in household
responsibilities
Women may enter and exit labor force over
business cycles

Women

Men
Uncertain

Men
Women
Men

Women

models can be estimated in discrete time or in continuous time. In part
this depends on the frequency of data. Proportional hazard models
require distributional assumptions, or the Box-Cox model can be used
to estimate the functional form implied by the data. Censoring at both
ends is likely to be present, and some studies resolve the left censoring
issue by examining workers in their ﬁrst jobs using, say, the NLSY79.
The usual question of whether to control for occupation and industry
arises in the modeling decision. Most studies control for wage, but not
all. Inclusion of wage serves as a proxy for investment in speciﬁc capital
and is expected to have a negative eﬀect on quit rates as alternative
wage oﬀers are less likely to be higher. The results, however, are not generally driven by whether or not wage is included as a control variable.
Before individual panel data became available, studies that examine
gender diﬀerences in quits use aggregate data. An early study is by
Barnes and Jones (1974). This study uses as the dependent variable the
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average quit rate over the period 1950–1968 for females and for males
in 19 two-digit industries, controlling for the proportion of young and
old workers of each sex in the industry as well as controlling for average
industry wage by sex. Higher wages are associated with lower industry
quit rates for both men and women, with the coeﬃcient on female quit
rates three times that of males.2
Individual panel data provides a better method for analyzing quit
rates as it allows controlling for individual-speciﬁc and job characteristics, and most studies of gender diﬀerences in quits are based on
individual panel data. Two widely used datasets are the Panel Study
to Income Dynamics (PSID) and various waves of the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS). These datasets contain extensive information on
individual characteristics, and most or all of the studies discussed here
control for demographic information including race, education, number of children, marital status, age (or alternatively work experience),
and health status. Studies vary in whether controls for union status,
industry, occupation, or percent female in industry or occupation are
included. Studies also vary in whether controls for general labor market
conditions, such as local unemployment rates, are included. Controls
for metropolitan status and region are also generally included as they
reﬂect labor market opportunities.
Because of known properties of duration dependence with respect
to tenure, studies in this area control for tenure, in some cases distinguishing between low tenure of less than one year and more than one
year of tenure. Turnover is highest in the ﬁrst year of a job. Studies
also diﬀer in whether and how they control for wage. The inclusion of
wage in quit equations can be interpreted as a proxy for human capital
characteristics that inﬂuence the wage rate, which in turn inﬂuences
the quit decision. Some studies (e.g., Viscusi, 1980) also control for
the diﬀerence between actual and predicted wage, which tests whether
workers who earn more than predicted are less likely to quit.
The two key early studies in this area are by Viscusi (1980) and Blau
and Kahn (1981). Both studies demonstrate that women actually have
2 Sample

mean of quit rates and wages were not reported, but my rough calculations
yield elasticities of −0.91 for women and −0.67 for men assuming average wages equal
to national values at the time period.
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lower quit rates than men controlling for job characteristics. Viscusi
(1980) uses data from the 1975 and 1976 PSID to examine whether the
individual had quit the job held in 1975 by 1976. Overall the unadjusted
female quit rate was double the male quit rates (0.084 and 0.167).
Breaking down quit rates by tenure shows that quit rates are highest
in the ﬁrst year of tenure, with quit rates of 13.6 and 28.0 for males
and females. But males and females with more than one year of tenure
have similar unadjusted quit rates, with male quit rates higher or lower
than females depending on tenure (indeed, the quit rate for men with
1–2 years of tenure is nearly double that of corresponding women, 10.5
to 5.4). However, females are more likely than men to have less than
one year of tenure, with nearly half the women in the sample having less
than one year of tenure, in contrast to a little more than one-quarter
of the males.
Logit estimates reveal the source of the gender disparity. The equations control for wage or diﬀerence between actual and predicted wage
as well as demographic information (age, race, education, number of
children, married, and health status), tenure, tenure less than one year,
union, region, industry injury and illness rate, industry percent female,
and area unemployment rate. Controlling for injury rates is atypical in
such studies. If workers are not informed about injury risk, or are not
compensated for such risk, quit probability may increase, and this may
vary by gender. Preliminary tests show that quit equations need to be
estimated separately for men and women. The key factor leading to
higher female quit rates is that the female coeﬃcient on less than one
year of tenure is over two times the size of the coeﬃcient for men, in
combination with the fact that women are far more likely than men to
have less than one year of tenure. After one year, tenure has no eﬀect on
quit rates. Viscusi ﬁnds similar elasticities of quits with respect to wage
of −0.93 for both sexes, and likewise similar elasticities with respect to
the wage gap (−0.42 for males and −0.48 for females). This indicates
that the quit propensities of men and women with respect to wage do
not diﬀer.
Viscusi’s ﬁnding of similar elasticities of quits with respect to wage
for men and women is relevant to understanding the gender pay gap.
Workers who are less responsive to ﬁnancial incentives would be paid
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less, all else equal. But because men and women have similar elasticities
of quits with respect to wage, this cannot explain women’s lower wages.
These logit regression results indicate that unadjusted sex diﬀerences
in quit rates are due to diﬀerences in job characteristics rather than
behavior or personal characteristics. In fact, substituting female values
of explanatory variables into the male equations shows that the
female quit rate would increase if females faced the male quit equation.
Similarly, if women had the same characteristics as men, and continued
to face the female equation, their quit rate would be below men’s.
Blau and Kahn (1981) perform an analysis of gender diﬀerences
in quits using data from the NLS Young Men (NLSYM) and Young
Women (NLSYW), using the years 1969–1970 and 1970–1971 for men;
and 1970–1971 and 1971–1972 for women. Their dependent variable
is whether the individual had voluntarily quit the initial job by the
subsequent year’s survey. They estimate separate probit equations for
men and women by race. In contrast to Viscusi, which is based on
workers of a wide age range, the individuals in these NLS surveys are
considerably younger, as male sample members are 14–24 years in 1966,
and female sample members are 14–24 years in 1968. But since most
turnover occurs among the young, this is the age range which provides
much of the observed turnover and captures turnover that occurs in
the formative state of careers. The quit equations control for education,
potential experience and its square, tenure, military service, or draft
status if male, married, dependents, other family income, family assets,
own hourly wage, log of median income of respondents sex in threedigit occupation, union, white-collar occupation, mining, construction
or manufacturing industry, SMSA unemployment rate, south, and size
of labor market.
Blau and Kahn ﬁnd that those with greater tenure are less likely to
quit, with the magnitude of the eﬀect among both whites and blacks
more than twice as large for males than for females. Blau and Kahn predict quit rates by substituting the average values of the male (female)
characteristics into the female (male) equation. They ﬁnd that women
would be less likely than men to quit if women faced the male quit equation or if men faced the male equation but had the average characteristics of women. Furthermore, if instead of swapping all characteristics,
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consider just giving females the average male job characteristics (wage,
income, collective bargaining, occupation, and industry). Again, the
female quit rate would be below the male rate if females had male job
characteristics.
These two papers, Viscusi (1980) and Blau and Kahn (1981),
demonstrate that the apparent higher female quit rates are actually
due to the worse jobs in which women are employed. If women had
the job characteristics of men, their quit rate would be lower than that
of men. This sheds light on statistical discrimination explanations of
the gender wage gap. If employers believe that women have higher quit
rates than men, they will use this information to statistically discriminate and refrain from hiring women in jobs with considerable training
or ﬁxed employment costs. Yet, this perception is invalid. However,
statistical discrimination can arise even if mean quit rates are identical
if the probability of quitting is more variable for one group due to risk
aversion on the part of employers.
To follow up on the question as to whether greater variability among
women in quit probability could support statistical discrimination,
Light and Ureta (1992) examine whether employers indeed err more
in predicting quits for women than for men. This paper uses the data
set employed by Blau and Kahn (1981), the NLSYM and NLSYW,
but over a longer period, speciﬁcally over the period 1966–1981 (men)
and 1968–1985 (women), using the period when individuals were age
24–31 years. They analyze the sample as two cohorts, an early cohort
(women born in 1944–1946 and men born in 1942–1944), and a late
cohort (women born in 1952–1954 and men born 1950–1952). Light and
Ureta estimate proportional hazard models with time-varying covariates, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. (Examination of whether
heterogeneity is individual-speciﬁc or job-match speciﬁc indicates that
it is individual-speciﬁc.) Estimation uses a discrete time model to
allow for the presence of time-varying regressors, with intervals of
3 months.
Light and Ureta start by estimating hazard equations controlling
only for characteristics that can be observed at the time of hire. The
next stage adds child and marriage characteristics that may inﬂuence
turnover. The fullest speciﬁcation controls for race, changes in marital
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status, whether a child is born, whether a child is age 6 years or younger,
education, years of potential prior experience, ratio of actual to potential prior experience, gap in time between end of last job and start
of new job, whether last job terminated involuntarily, whether initial
occupation on new job is the same as last job, part-time, wage, union,
industry, occupation, local unemployment rate, south, whether SMSA,
and year indicators. The hazard estimates are then used to predict
the probability that workers of diﬀerent characteristics will have a job
separation within the next 6 months.
Over the full age range, Light and Ureta ﬁnd more unobserved heterogeneity among female workers. This implies that employers are less
able to identify which women will quit than which men. However, stratiﬁcation into the early and late cohorts reveals that within the more
recent cohort, female quitters can be predicted more accurately than
male quitters. Of the characteristics that may be unknown at hire,
only the birth of a newborn has a substantial impact on female quits.
That is, among more recent labor market participants, tenure can be
predicted as accurately for female as male workers, particularly once
fertility is completed.
Also of interest is whether the reasons for turnover diﬀer by sex.
Such information may help explain whether match quality or long- versus short-run factors diﬀer by sex. Sicherman (1996) examines departures from a single ﬁrm (a large insurance company with headquarters
in NYC and branches across the US) over the period 1971–1980 and
examines reported information on the reason for departure. Controlling
for personal characteristics, job grade, and tenure, he ﬁnds structural
diﬀerences in the reported reason for quitting. Women report dissatisfaction with working conditions or a desire for “higher earnings”
more frequently than do men, while men cite “greater opportunity”
more frequently than do women. Sicherman interprets the ﬁndings to
mean that men’s mobility is explained by long-run career considerations
while short-run market conditions are more important for women’s
mobility.
How gender diﬀerences in search aﬀects turnover and whether discrimination plays a residual role is addressed by Bowlus (1997). Among
the well-documented gender diﬀerences are the greater propensity of
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women to exit to nonemployment,3 as well as the longer duration in
nonemployment especially of those exiting to nonparticipation. Bowlus
uses a search model of Mortensen (1990) allowing for three types of
separation behavior rather than the two states used in Mortensen.
The model sets up as competing hypotheses that the gender wage
diﬀerential is generated by diﬀerences in behavior, or alternatively by
diﬀerences in productivity. Discrimination is not explicitly modeled
and, if present, would be reﬂected in the behavioral component
and the productivity component. Speciﬁcally, any portion of the
wage diﬀerential not explained by search patterns is attributed to
productivity diﬀerences.
The search model used by Bowlus allows for transitions from unemployment to employment, job to job, and so forth, with transitions
aﬀected by the arrival rates of job oﬀers in each state, the job destruction rate, and changes in the value of time in the nonparticipation
state (which can be interpreted as changes in home production). The
model is a conventional search model in which individuals adopt a
reservation wage strategy. Exits to nonparticipation are exogenous.
Gender diﬀerences in tendency to exit the labor market to nonparticipation would result in women having a lower reservation wage than
men. If males and females operate in diﬀerent markets (as would be
consistent with observed sex segregation) then lower average wages
for women would result in this framework by several means, such as
a higher exit rate into nonparticipation that lowers the reservation
wage.
Bowlus uses data from the NLSY79 for 1979–1991. The sample is
restricted to white workers who are either high school graduates or
those with 16 or more years of education. She ﬁnds that search accounts
for 20–30 percent of the wage diﬀerential for high school graduates and
15–20 percent for college graduates, with on-the-job search accounting
for even greater shares of the wage diﬀerential as on-the-job search
moved workers up the wage oﬀer distribution over time. The remainder
is explained in this model as due to productivity diﬀerences.
3 However,

female high school graduates have longer ﬁrst job durations than male high
school graduates.
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Royalty (1998) examines the roles of destination of turnover and
level of education in explaining diﬀerences between men and women
in turnover behavior. Using NLSY79 data for 1979–1987, the average
stay probabilities of 68 percent for women and 67 percent for men do
not diﬀer signiﬁcantly by gender. The role of education in inﬂuencing
turnover varies with the destination of turnover. But women have lower
average job-to-job turnover and higher job-to-nonemployment turnover
than do men. Less educated women have higher job-to-nonemployment
turnover, while more educated women have higher job-to-job turnover.
Royalty estimates discrete multinomial probit equations controlling for
tenure on current job and its square, actual labor market experience
and its square, health status, union status, real wage on current job
and its square, asset income, a married indicator variable, number of
children, local unemployment rate, whether in school during the year,
nonwhite indicator, and indicators for highest level of education. In
sum, given the lack of diﬀerence between turnover, quit-type turnover
does not explain the gender wage gap.

5.3

How Turnover Aﬀects Wages

There is extensive literature documenting the negative wage eﬀect of
discontinuous labor force participation. There is also extensive literature documenting that voluntary job change results in higher wage
growth than not changing or than involuntary change. But whether
an individual exits to another job or leaves the labor force may have
an eﬀect on earnings at the next job that may diﬀer by gender. Only
expected tenure rather than destination after leaving will matter for
employers concerned about ﬁxed costs of hiring or sorting into jobs
with lower training or capital. But, if job-to-job turnover represents
improving match quality, then we would expect that wages will be
higher for those whose turnover resulted in another job than for those
who interrupt their job history with periods out of the labor force.
Once the reason for job change is taken into account, there should be
little gender diﬀerence in the return to mobility, which is what Keith
and McWilliams (1997) ﬁnd.
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However, search behavior can diﬀer by gender, and this may have
an eﬀect on wages. Search behavior of men and women may diﬀer
in intensity of search eﬀort, reservation wage, or wage and oﬀer functions. Intensity is inversely related to costs of search. While direct costs
should not diﬀer by gender, opportunity costs may be higher for women
because the value of their time at home is higher. Reservation wages
will be inversely related to search costs, suggesting that women’s reservation wage will be lower than men’s. The oﬀer probability and wage
oﬀer functions may diﬀer if search technology, such as use of informal
versus formal means of search, diﬀers by gender. Such gender diﬀerences
can arise if women indeed have fewer informal or personal contacts due
to occupational segregation or greater home time. Job mobility and
search may interact, in that those who anticipate mobility can undertake search while still employed. Thus gender diﬀerences in returns to
mobility can arise from diﬀerent mobility patterns by gender, the likelihood of employed search may vary by mobility type or by gender, and
there may be interactions between employed search and mobility.
Keith and McWilliams (1999) address gender diﬀerences in search
behavior using NLSY79 data for 1979–1984. All job separations are
classiﬁed as either a layoﬀ, a discharge, a family-related quit, or a
nonfamily-related quit. These years are used because information on
employed job search is also available. Separations among these young
workers are high, and although there are statistically signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in the likelihoods of separation, whether involuntary or
not, and in the reason for separation, the magnitude of the diﬀerences
are not stark. Most separations are quits, followed by layoﬀs, and only
8.4 percent of the female quits are for family-related reasons, compared
to 3.8 percent of men’s.

6
Children and Housework

Perhaps the most frequently oﬀered reason for women’s relative
disadvantage in the labor market stems from the primary role
women assume in the home. Only women bear children, and, regardless of marital status, women spend considerably more time than
men on home production. Motherhood and household responsibilities may directly lower wages. Alternatively, lower pay for mothers
and those with greater household responsibilities may arise because
such women would be less productive even in the absence of childbirth and housework. Furthermore, these family choices may indirectly lower wages if women take jobs with work characteristics that
warrant lower pay as a compensating diﬀerential for characteristics that are compatible with family and household responsibilities.
Before discussing empirical studies, it is worthwhile to look at some
statistics.

6.1

Children and Housework: Statistics

Often cited as the primary source of any gender disparity in economic
outcomes is childbirth and childcare. Despite the arduous demands
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Table 6.1 Labor force participation rates of females by age of youngest child, selected years
1975–2004.

No children under age 18 years
Youngest child under age 6 years
Youngest child age 6–17 years
Total

1975

1980

1990

2000

2004

45.1
39.0
54.9
46.3

48.1
46.8
64.3
51.5

52.3
58.2
74.7
57.5

54.8
65.3
79.0
59.9

53.8
62.2
77.5
59.2

Notes: Noninstitutional population age 16 years and over, annual averages.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Women in the Labor Force: A Databook (2005). Adapted
from Tables 2 and 7.

of motherhood, as shown in Table 6.1, it has long been common for
mothers to participate in the labor force, even with children under age
6 years, and especially for those with children age 6 years and older.
Since 1990, three-quarters or more of women whose youngest child is
6–17 years old have been in the labor force.
Table 6.2 suggests how the presence of children aﬀects earnings
of men and women. Note that regardless of marital status, women’s
earnings are highest among those without children under age 18 years.
Men’s earnings are the highest among those whose youngest child is
ages 6–17 years. Not-married men and women have earnings considerably lower than their counterparts with the same children status, and
the gender gap is narrower among not-married women and men. Notice
the similarity of women and men’s earnings among those not married
and without children under age 18 years. The similarity of childless
unmarried men and women is often cited as support for the premise
that women’s lower earnings derive from choices to exert less market
eﬀort because of marriage and children. It should be noted, however,
that the similarity of earnings is mainly attributable to the low earnings
of never-married men combined with most never-married and childless
men and women being at an early point of their careers where there
is little earnings disparity. Indeed, never-married men earn only 63.9
percent as much as married men.1
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) began collecting time
use information in January 2003. This survey, the American Time
1 Calculations

from Table 1 of U.S. Department of Labor, Highlights of Women’s Earnings
in 2004 (2005).
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Table 6.2 Median usual weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers by sex, marital
status, and presence and age of own children under 18 years old, 2004.
Youngest child
under 6 years

Youngest child
6–17 years

None under 18 years

Married, spouse present
Female
Male
F/M %

592
775
76.4

591
842
70.2

615
807
76.2

Other marital statuses
Female
Male
F/M %

423
513
82.4

519
695
74.7

546
570
95.8

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2004 (2005).
Adapted from Table 8.

Use Survey (ATUS), is administered by means of a retrospective
phone interview to a subsample of about 2000 individuals completing their ﬁnal CPS interview. Diary responses to time use are
grouped into broad categories, including market work time, leisure
time, and personal care time. Of particular interest for our purposes is time spent on household activities and on childcare. Household activities include housework, food preparation and cleanup, lawn
and garden care, and household management, as well as vehicle
and home maintenance and repair, and pet care. Primary childcare
includes physical care, playing with children, reading to children,
assistance with homework, attending children’s events, taking care of
children’s healthcare needs, and dropping oﬀ, picking up, and waiting for children. Other activities involving children, such as cooking
for children, are included under household activities and not under
childcare.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 report statistics from the ATUS for 2004.
Table 6.3 reports time per day spent on household activities and on
childcare as the primary activity by sex, age of youngest child, and
employment status. Table 6.4 reports time per day on household activities by sex and marital status. Time spent on household activities
clearly depends on both sex and marital status, with women doing from
50 to 100 percent more than men, regardless of employment or marital
status.
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Table 6.3 Average hours per day spent on household activities and childcare by employment
status and age of youngest household children, 2004.
Household activities
Age of youngest child
Under
6 years

Childcare
Age of youngest child

6–17 years

None under
18 years

Under 6 years

6–17 years

Employed
Female
Male
F/M

2.03
1.14
1.78

2.01
1.30
1.55

1.74
1.15
1.51

2.19
1.10
1.99

0.69
0.37
1.86

Not employed
Female
Male
F/M

3.29
2.09
1.57

3.38
1.72
1.97

2.92
2.00
1.46

2.87
1.21
2.37

1.10
0.66
1.67

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, American Time Use Survey, 2004. Adapted from
Table 8.
Table 6.4 Average hours per day spent on household activities by marital status, 2004.

Female
Male
F/M

Total

Married spouse present

Other marital status

2.25
1.32
1.70

2.71
1.56
1.74

1.72
1.00
1.72

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, American Time Use Survey, 2004. Adapted from
Tables 1 and 3.

6.2

Theoretical and Empirical Framework

To see how children and housework can aﬀect wages, a general wage
equation can be written as follows:
ln Wit = Xit β + Fit λ + uit ,
uit = µi + εit ,

(6.1)
(6.2)

where W represents the log of the real hourly wage of individual i at
time t, X is a vector of human capital characteristics such as education
and experience, and F is a vector of family factors such as number of
children and time spent on household activities. The term uit is the
error term and consists of two components as indicated in Eq. (6.2).
The ﬁrst term, µi , is an individual-speciﬁc unobserved ﬁxed eﬀect, while
the second term εit is a random error term.
For convenience in exposition, F represents all family factors as
a single variable. Note that if family factors, such as children or
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housework, have a direct negative eﬀect on wages, then we expect
λ < 0. If, however, family factors are correlated with uit , then OLS
estimates of the eﬀect of family factors on wage will be biased. There
are two ways in which such a correlation can arise. First, the correlation
could arise from the unobserved individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect µi . For
instance, if individuals with higher innate market productivity are less
likely to either have children or spend considerable time on housework,
then the coeﬃcient on children or housework estimated by OLS will
be biased downward. Second, children or housework and wages may be
jointly endogenous. Workers with higher wages may be less likely to
have children or may perform less housework, as they are more likely
to purchase market substitutes for their housework time. The number
of children or time on housework will be lower for higher-wage workers,
so observed number of children or housework time will be correlated
with the error term uit . Once again OLS estimates will be biased downward, showing children or housework to have a greater negative eﬀect
on wages than true.
If panel data are available, ﬁxed eﬀects estimation can be used
to eliminate the bias arising from unobserved individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects.2 If suitable instruments are available, instrumental variables
(IV) techniques can be used to yield consistent estimates of the wage–
housework relation no matter the nature of the correlation. Both
approaches have been used to estimate the magnitude of the eﬀect
of family factors on earnings.

6.3

Empirical Evidence of a Family Pay Gap

The family gap in pay refers to lower hourly pay among women
with children compared to women without children. Although childless women have average wages close to that of the average men (with
or without children), the average wage of women with children is
substantially below that of men (and correspondingly below that of
childless women). Cross-sectional regressions controlling for individual
2 Note

however that greater ability might imply steeper age–earnings proﬁles, which would
not be accounted for in ﬁxed eﬀects estimation, which restricts the role of unobserved
ability to an intercept eﬀect.
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characteristics likewise often (but not always) ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of
children on earnings. The source of this family gap is a matter of dispute. Both labor force participation and hours worked are lower for
women with young children. Interruptions to work history alone with
corresponding loss of human capital can cause a family gap. Goldin
(1997) shows that even among college-educated women, women with
children are less likely to work full time over a 3-year period than nonmothers and have lower earnings relative to men than non-mothers.
Data sets available when the earliest work on the gender pay gap was
done lacked information on actual work history, and analyses would use
potential experience as a proxy for work experience. Marital status and
presence of children would be included as proxies for characteristics,
such as labor force attachment, years out of the labor force, limitations
on work location and hours, or investments in training. The ﬁrst data
set to include detailed work history for women is the 1967 NLS of
mature women age 30–44 years. This survey includes retrospective work
history information in segments of market and nonmarket time over
the life cycle, reported relative to birth of children (such as market
time before ﬁrst child and home time after ﬁrst child). Mincer and
Polachek (1974) and Polachek (1975b) provide the ﬁrst evidence on
the family gap. Mincer and Polachek document time out of the market
and the eﬀects of such home time on wages, which vary considerably
by marital status and number of children. Periods out of the labor
force result in lower wages, which are interpreted in these papers as
evidence that market skills depreciate during time out of the labor
market. Notably, however, Mincer and Polachek ﬁnd little direct eﬀect
of children on wages once detailed work experience is included in the
regressions. Polachek shows how and why the gender gap varies with
marital status and children, by segmenting the lifecycle to account for
spacing of children. Having children in a shorter time period mitigates
the cost to time out of the labor market.
While the various NLS surveys include respondents in speciﬁed age
ranges, the PSID surveys household members of all ages. The 1976
wave of the PSID introduced extensive information on work history as
well as on wages for non-household heads over the full age range. The
data include very detailed information on work history and training,
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as well as on absenteeism by reason, whether job location or hours
are restricted, and whether the individual plans to stop work for nontraining reasons. Using the 1976 wave of the PSID, Hill (1979) ﬁnds
that inclusion of these detailed measures of work experience eliminates
the seeming child penalty.3 However, other studies continue to ﬁnd a
negative eﬀect of children on women’s wages.
Rather than children causing lower wages, an alternative explanation is that less-productive women may select into childbearing.
This selection may arise from unobserved heterogeneity between mothers and non-mothers, in that there may be a negative correlation
between characteristics, such as career-orientation or motivation, and
the desire to have children. One clue as to whether unobserved
heterogeneity is likely to be important is derived from a comparison of wages and labor supply behavior of women before and after
they have children. Unobserved heterogeneity would result in lower
wages for women who eventually have children even before any children are born. But even here the evidence is mixed. Waldfogel
(1998) ﬁnds no diﬀerence in pre-motherhood wages, but Lundberg
and Rose (2000) ﬁnd that women who eventually become mothers
have wages 9 percentage points lower than those who never have
children.
First diﬀerence and ﬁxed eﬀects estimates have been used to examine the role of unobserved heterogeneity, again yielding mixed ﬁndings. Korenman and Neumark (1992) use ﬁrst diﬀerence estimates and
ﬁnd a smaller penalty thereby indicating the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity. But their estimates using a sample of sisters continue
to show a child penalty (Neumark and Korenman, 1994). Waldfogel
(1997a) shows a wage penalty for women with children relative to
3 Hill

starts by presenting hourly wage regressions by sex and race controlling only for
marital status, number of children, potential experience and its square, education, and
whether south and city size. These regressions show a substantial marriage premium for
white and black men of over 20 percent, no marital eﬀects for women, and a statistically
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect per child of 7 percent for white women only. Inclusion of actual
work history and hours worked leaves the marriage eﬀects largely unaﬀected but eliminates
the negative children eﬀect for white women. In fact, black women earn nearly 3 percent
more per child. These ﬁndings suggest that in the absence of information on actual work
experience, inclusion of the number of children in regressions serve as a proxy for work
experience, but marriage does not proxy for work experience.
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women without children, but estimated over a 12 or more year period,
ﬁxed eﬀects and cross-sectional estimates yield similar penalties, suggesting unobserved heterogeneity is not important. Budig and England
(2001) also ﬁnd similar wage penalties for motherhood in ﬁxed eﬀects
and cross-sectional estimates, with penalties of 2–10 percent for one
child, and 5–13 percent for two or more.4
Rather than a wage penalty arising out of individual heterogeneity,
giving birth may well be determined endogenously with both labor
supply and earnings. For example, the time to give birth may be when
wages are unusually low, or women with low market productivity may
choose to have children. Instrumental variables methods have been used
to examine endogenous fertility. Unsurprisingly, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd
instruments, and other approaches have been to use samples of twin
births and to use gender composition of children (assuming that families
strive to have mixed gender oﬀspring).
An ideal experiment to avoid the problem of endogeneity of birth
would be to randomly assign an infant to women. A more viable alternative is to examine the eﬀect of multiple births on earning, as additional
children are almost certainly exogenous. Jacobsen et al. (1999) undertake this analysis. Their study uses data drawn from the 1970 and 1980
PUMS of the Census. The sample size for 1970 was almost 500,000,
with 3,445 twin births; for 1980 it was over 1.2 million, with 8,976 twin
births. Three labor supply responses are estimated: (i) whether the
mother worked for pay in the year preceding the Census; (ii) number
of weeks worked in the year preceding the Census; and (iii) number of
hours worked in the week preceding the Census. Representative ﬁndings
with respect to labor supply are that the overall eﬀect of twin ﬁrst-birth
lowers the probability of working by 1.4 (1.6) percentage points in 1969
(1979). But the impact is concentrated within the ﬁrst 2 years after the
twin birth, with probability of working 15.7 (11.5) percentage points
lower than for those with single birth in 1969 (1979). The impact of
twin birth relative to single birth disappears as children age. Similar
4 Budig

and England (2001) also examine whether mothers choose less energy-demanding
occupations and conclude that such “mother-friendly” jobs explain little of the motherhood
wage penalty.
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patterns appear for weeks worked and hours worked per week, with the
eﬀects persisting somewhat longer as children age.
Jacobsen et al. ﬁnd no evidence that twin birth leads to changes
in occupation. But there is an adverse eﬀect of twin birth on earnings
that persists longer than does the eﬀect of twin birth on labor supply,
although even this negative eﬀect on earnings disappears after the ﬁrst
child is 11 years or older. Instrumental variables estimates using twin
birth as an instrument for number of children likewise show a negative
eﬀect of fertility on labor supply and earnings, but the magnitudes,
while generally statistically signiﬁcant, are small, as well as smaller in
magnitude than without IV estimates. Furthermore, declining fertility
from 1970 to 1980 accounts for only a small share of increased female
labor supply. Analyses of twin births have the limitation that it does
not allow examination of the eﬀect of going from no children to one
child (instead estimates the eﬀect of going from zero to two children).
Furthermore, the eﬀect of twin birth is not necessarily equivalent to
adding a net increase of one unplanned child to the household, but
instead is more likely to aﬀect the timing of births, lowering the number
of additional children.
To examine whether negative selection into parenthood is responsible for the family gap, Lundberg and Rose (2000) examine the eﬀect of
continuous versus noncontinuous employment on wages using a sample
of husband and wife couples in marriages of at least 5 years duration from the PSID 1980–1992. Most of the couples have children. The
dependent variables are log of hourly wage and total hours worked
during the year, and both random eﬀects and ﬁxed eﬀects equations
are estimated. Continuous participants are identiﬁed as those in which
the wife participates continuously other than a year in which she gave
birth. The random eﬀects speciﬁcation allows tracing out the age–wage
and age–hours proﬁle even for those whose childbirth status did not
change.5
These estimates presented in Lundberg and Rose indicate dramatic
diﬀerences between the continuously employed and the noncontinuous
5 Although

random eﬀects will be inconsistent if the random eﬀect is correlated with the
regressors, the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates in this study are similar, giving credence to the
random eﬀects estimates.
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samples. Furthermore, those who eventually give birth have lower earnings than non-childbearers even before giving birth, earning about
9 percent less than non-childbearers before birth, which increases to
about 15 percent after birth. Thus, overall, the birth of a ﬁrst child
is associated with an additional 6 percentage point reduction in the
mother’s wage rate. But mothers who are continuously employed following ﬁrst birth do not have a wage penalty in addition to the
one they have relative to nonparents. This ﬁnding is consistent with
Waldfogel’s (1998) ﬁnding that those with job-protected maternity
leave who return to work do not incur a wage loss. Fixed eﬀects results
show an overall wage reduction of 5 percent following childbirth, with
no reduction for those continuously employed. In contrast, the wages of
mothers who experience a substantial interruption following the birth
of a ﬁrst child fall by 25 percent.
Anderson et al. (2003) examine the role of timing of return to work
in estimates of the motherhood penalty. They note that estimates of
the eﬀect of childbearing on wages may be obscured because there
are diﬀerences in career orientation or return to same job of mothers who return to work quickly versus those who spend more time
out of the labor market following birth. Hence, mothers who return to
work quickly may be more career oriented and may not incur a penalty
both by returning quickly and because of innate attributes, but when
pooled with other mothers there may seem to be a penalty for all mothers. Also, wages may suﬀer because mothers spend less eﬀort at work
or because scheduling conﬂicts interact with work and reduce wages.
Physical eﬀorts and sleep interruptions are greatest when children are
young, but older children pose more scheduling challenges. Thus, if
the child penalty declines as children age, then eﬀort may explain the
penalty, but if it persists independently of children’s age, then work
schedule conﬂicts may be important.
To examine the eﬀects of education and child’s age on wages,
Anderson et al. use data from the 1968–1988 NLSYW. Controlling
for education, actual work experience and its square, age and its
square, part-time employment, occupation, other adults in household,
husband’s income, and nonlabor income yields a wage penalty of
5.3 percent for one child and 7.6 percent for two or more children
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in cross-sectional estimates. Using the same control variables yields a
penalty of 3 percent for one child and 5.7 percent for two or more
children in ﬁxed eﬀects estimates that ignore the age of child when
the mother returned to the workforce. Thus unobserved heterogeneity accounts for about one-third of the child penalty. Because the vast
majority (74 percent) of the mothers in the sample return to the workforce when their youngest child is 2 years old or younger, the ﬁxed
eﬀects estimates for those in this group are similar to the estimates
for the entire sample, and there is no evidence of a penalty for those
returning to the workforce when the child is older.
Stratifying the sample by the age of youngest child at return to
the workforce and mapping out the wage pattern as the child(ren)
age shows that the penalty is largest at the time the mother of preschool age children returns to work, and the penalty tapers oﬀ. Women
who return to work when the youngest child is 0–2 years experience
a penalty of 2.6 percent when the child is that age, but this drops to
1 percent when the child is 3–5 years and to less than 1 percent when
ages 6–10 years, becoming insigniﬁcant thereafter. The child penalty for
those returning to work when the child is 3–5 years incur a penalty of
3.9 percent when the child is that age, but no penalty thereafter, while
there is no penalty for those returning when the child is age 6–17 years.
One interpretation of these ﬁndings is that adjustment costs are
highest shortly after return to work, as well as with a job matching
explanation in which the initial time period after returning to work is
the time when a preferred match is being sought. But the tapering oﬀ of
any wage penalty over time is also consistent with the hypothesis that
work eﬀort is greatest among women with younger children. Stratiﬁcation by education indicates that in ﬁxed eﬀects estimates, penalties are
incurred only among those who are high school graduates or have some
college, but there is no penalty among those with less than high school
or college graduates. The authors interpret this as evidence against
the work eﬀort hypothesis, arguing that work eﬀort should be greatest
among the most educated.
There is a range of possible labor supply responses to the presence
of children. Some mothers take minimal time oﬀ, and the passage of the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) formalized the conditions in
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which returning to the original employer was likely. Using panel data
from the NLSY79 and NLSYW, Waldfogel (1998) ﬁnds that women
who return to their employer within 12 months after a recent birth
have wages 11–12 percent higher than women who did not return so
quickly, due to greater experience and work tenure. Coverage by maternity leave also results in higher wages upon return. Those who had
maternity coverage and return to their employer do not suﬀer any wage
loss (Waldfogel, 1997b).
Other women exit for longer periods or may return to part-time jobs
or jobs in a diﬀerent occupation that may provide more ﬂexibility or
require less eﬀort (and may have lower wages because of compensating
diﬀerentials). Presumably only those women whose opportunity cost
at home is less than their wage rate return to the labor market at the
time childcare demands are extensive, so such selection would tend to
mitigate the child pay gap. Studies taking into account the actual eﬀect
on labor supply in terms of elapsed time oﬀ or hours worked may yield
diﬀerent conclusions.
Most studies estimate the family gap using women in a wide range
of occupations. It is of interest to see whether highly educated women
in professions also experience a motherhood penalty. Sasser (2005) uses
data from the American Medical Association Young Physician’s Survey
to examine whether earnings of physicians fall after childbirth, and if
so, whether it is due to reduced hours or lower productivity. Prior to
marriage or to having children, women who later married or became
mothers had higher earnings than those who did not marry or have
children.6 However, after marriage or children, a considerable pay gap
develops as these women reduce their hours of work.
To examine eﬀort reduction versus simply hours reduction, Sasser
compares the child gap in hourly wage and in annual earnings. Simply
reducing hours worked would reduce annual earnings but not hourly
pay, but reducing eﬀort would reduce both. If employer discrimination
against those with family responsibilities plays a role, then the gap
should be greater for those who are employees than those who are
6 This

ﬁnding diﬀers from Lundberg and Rose (2000) who show lower pre-child earnings for
eventual mothers within a broad range of occupations.
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self-employed. Sasser ﬁnds that the bulk of the gap is due to reduction
in annual hours rather than in reduced eﬀort per hour work in that there
is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in hourly earnings among women based on
number of children. However, children inﬂuence annual hours worked.
There is no diﬀerence between males and females in the number of
patients seen per hour, so diﬀerences in productivity do not seem to
be an important determinant of the gap. The gender pay gap is the
same or even greater when stratifying by self-employed and employee
physicians, suggesting that employer discrimination is probably not
important (nor would be customer discrimination as physicians’ marital
and parental status are unlikely to be observed).

6.4

Eﬀect of Housework on Earnings

There is substantial literature documenting a negative relation between
housework and wages. This eﬀect appears consistently for women
across a variety of data sets. Coverman (1983) uses the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey, Hersch (1985) uses data on piece rate
workers, Shelton and Firestone (1989) use the 1981 Time Use Survey, Hersch (1991c) and Stratton (2001) a regional wage survey collected by Hersch, Hersch (1991b), Hersch and Stratton (1997), and
Hundley (2000) the PSID,7 Noonan (2001) and Hersch and Stratton
(2002) use data from the National Survey of Families and Households,
Phipps et al. (2001) use data from the 1995 Statistics Canada General
Social Survey, Bonke et al. (2003) use data from the 1987 Danish Time
Use Survey, and Keith and Malone (2005) use data from the PSID. The
magnitudes of the eﬀect of housework time on wages tend to be fairly
small but are statistically signiﬁcant. Estimates for men largely fail to
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation between wages and housework or ﬁnd a much
smaller eﬀect.
Many of these studies estimate wage equations by OLS and control
for standard human capital measures. Similar concerns about endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity arise here as with estimates of the
eﬀect of children on wages. For example, individuals receiving higher
7 Hundley

examines the eﬀect of housework on the pay gap in self-employed workers.
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market wages may be more likely to hire household help. As such, a
wage equation including controls for housework may yield biased and
inconsistent parameter estimates. Furthermore, the negative housework
eﬀect may be spurious due to omitted ﬁxed eﬀects if individuals doing
much housework are innately less productive at market work. Housework time may be a proxy for some individual speciﬁc characteristic
such as “taste for market employment” or “market ambition.”
Hersch and Stratton (1997) examine whether the housework–wage
eﬀect is due to unobserved heterogeneity or endogeneity using panel
data from the 1979–1987 PSID. Fixed eﬀects estimates indicate that
housework time continues to have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect upon
wages for married women in ﬁxed eﬀects results, although the magnitude is about one-third as that estimated using OLS. While OLS
estimates for men indicate a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of housework on
wages for men, there is no eﬀect of housework on wages for men in a
ﬁxed eﬀects model. However, housework time is almost invariant over
time for men. Furthermore, the nature of the question on housework
available on the PSID is likely to result in particularly weak estimates
of housework time for men.8 If reported diﬀerences in housework for
men over time are primarily due to measurement error, then the housework coeﬃcient would be biased toward zero for men, particularly in
the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation. Estimation with better housework data
(such as that available in the ATUS) could help identify if there is a
negative relation between housework and wages for men that is not
driven by individual speciﬁc eﬀects.
To address concerns about bias due to possible joint endogeneity
between housework time and wages, Hersch and Stratton also estimate
instrumental variables equations using alternative instrument sets to
establish robustness, and consistently ﬁnd a negative and statistically
8 The

housework question on the PSID asks: “About how much time do (you or your spouse)
spend on housework in an average week? I mean time spent cooking, cleaning, and doing
other work around the house.” The question does not speciﬁcally request information on
childcare, but as the presence of children adds 5 hours per week on average to women’s
housework time (and less than 1 hour to men’s average), it is likely that activities such as
extra laundry and cleaning associated with children are included in the report of housework
time. Comparison to the ATUS diary information supports this interpretation once the
youngest household child is over age 6 years.
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signiﬁcant eﬀect of housework on wages for women, although the eﬀect
for men is neither stable nor statistically signiﬁcant. These results conﬁrm that coeﬃcient estimates from IV regressions are largely similar to
those of OLS. Most importantly, there is strong evidence that housework is exogenous, giving further credence to the reliability of OLS
estimates.
The ﬁxed eﬀects and instrumental variables results indicate that the
OLS ﬁnding of a negative eﬀect of housework on wages is genuine, at
least for women, and endogeneity does not seem to be a fatal problem.
Comparison of ﬁxed eﬀects to IV results suggests that measurement
error is likely to bias toward zero the estimated eﬀects.
The general failure to ﬁnd a relation between housework and wages
for men and the results reported in Hersch (1991c) that only housework
performed on job days yields a negative eﬀect of housework on wages for
women suggest that the relation between housework and wages may not
be a simple relation between total time and wages. There may be some
threshold of time that must be crossed before housework aﬀects wages,
or the eﬀect of housework on wages may diﬀer by type of housework,
or the timing of housework rather than the total amount of housework
may inﬂuence the relation.
Observing the vast disparity between men and women in total
housework time suggests that although relatively small amounts of time
on household activities undertaken by men can easily ﬁt into the day
and will not be fatiguing or disruptive, and can even be enjoyable, wages
may be aﬀected adversely by the large quantity performed by employed
women. Hersch and Stratton (1997) ﬁnd some evidence in support of
a threshold eﬀect for women. Women’s wages are not aﬀected by up
to ten hours of housework per week, with the negative eﬀect of housework kicking in after this point. There is no support, however, for a
threshold eﬀect of housework time for men, as the coeﬃcients are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other over the range of housework time
reported by men.
Rather than housework of any kind inﬂuencing wages, the type of
housework may matter. Household chores such as cooking, cleaning,
and laundry may aﬀect wages, while home maintenance that can often
be deferred may not. As women are far more likely to be responsible for
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routine activities performed almost daily, such as cooking and cleaning,
and men are more likely to be responsible for repairs and yard work,
this may explain the smaller or insigniﬁcant eﬀect of housework on
men’s wages.
To see whether the eﬀect on wages of housework time is aﬀected by
marital status and to see whether type of housework matters, Hersch
and Stratton (2002) use data from the National Survey of Families and
Households (NSFH). The NSFH requests respondents and their spouses
to report on time spent on nine diﬀerent household activities. Hersch
and Stratton group these activities into three categories reﬂecting the
observed gender stratiﬁcation of activities: (i) “Typically female” activities include meal preparation, washing dishes, cleaning, shopping for
groceries and other household goods, and laundry; (ii) “Typically male”
activities include outdoor and maintenance activities and auto repair;
(iii) “Neutral activities,” on which both men and women spend similar
amounts of time, include bill paying and driving others.
Hersch and Stratton’s analysis shows that the eﬀect of housework
on wages does not diﬀer by marital status. Housework time primarily
inﬂuences wages only for women, and the magnitude of the eﬀect is
similar across all marital statuses. Second, type of housework matters
considerably. Time spent on typically female housework has a significant eﬀect on women’s wages and is even marginally signiﬁcant for
married men. But with the exception of the eﬀect of neutral housework
on earnings for not-married men, no other type of housework has an
inﬂuence on wages.9
Finding that it is typically female housework that inﬂuences wages,
coupled with the ﬁnding in Hersch (1991c) that it is housework on job
days that inﬂuences wages, suggest that it is timing and/or limited
eﬀort during the workday that aﬀects wages.
The results in Hersch and Stratton (1997) indicate that although the
magnitude of the eﬀect of housework on wages is fairly small, with each
additional hour of housework reducing hourly wage by only about 4–
5 cents per hour, inclusion of housework in the wage equation explains a
9 Instrumental

variables estimates for women also show a negative relation between housework and wages, but Hersch and Stratton (2002) are not able to reject the hypothesis that
housework is exogenous for both men and women.
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large component of the gender wage gap. Estimates that do not control
for housework explain 27–30 percent of gender wage gap. Inclusion of
time on housework increases the explanatory power of the observables
to 38 percent. Furthermore, lowering women’s housework time would
have a large eﬀect on earnings. Decreasing housework to men’s average
would raise wages to the same level as increasing tenure to men’s average. Using data from the NSFH, Hersch and Stratton (2002) perform a
similar analysis using both married and not-married workers and ﬁnd
that inclusion in the wage equation of housework time increases the
explained component of the gender wage gap by about 14 percentage
points, from 29.1 percent when housework is excluded, to 43.4 percent.
Keith and Malone (2005) extend the analysis of Hersch and
Stratton (1997) to examine whether the eﬀect of housework on wages
varies over the life cycle. They use PSID data for 1983–1993. The sample is comprised of employed married men and women, who are stratiﬁed into three age groups: ages 20–24, 35–49, and 50–65 years. OLS
estimates indicate the housework time has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
on wages for all age groups and for both men and women. The eﬀect for
men disappears in ﬁxed eﬀects estimates and in Hausman–Taylor IV
(HTIV) estimates, but continues to show a negative eﬀect for women,
with the eﬀect for women in the oldest age group just failing to reach
signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level in ﬁxed eﬀects estimates. The magnitude of the wage penalty for women in the youngest age group is
nearly twice the size of the penalty of the middle-age group, suggesting
that life cycle has an inﬂuence. Housework demands are most disruptive when women are younger, perhaps because younger women are also
more likely to have young children. Inclusion of housework increases the
explained component of the wage gap between men and women of the
same age group, with the magnitude diﬀering based on whether OLS
or HTIV estimates are used. Overall, Keith and Malone report that
housework time contributes 3–10 percent of the explained portion of
the gap.

7
Compensating Diﬀerentials

The theory of compensating diﬀerentials maintains that workers receive
premium pay for undesirable work characteristics, such as fatality or
injury risks, and receive lower pay for attractive characteristics. Compensating diﬀerentials for work characteristics provide an attractive
interpretation of the gender pay gap. The working conditions in jobs
held by women on average tend to be in safer and more pleasant work
environments, as women are less likely than men to be in blue-collar
jobs or jobs requiring outdoor work or physical demands. Women may
choose jobs with working conditions that are compatible with heavy
household responsibilities, such as with shorter commutes or ﬂexible
schedules. Under the theory of compensating diﬀerentials, the pay disparity arises because of gender diﬀerences in preferences about working
conditions.
Most of the empirical literature has estimated wage–risk tradeoﬀs.
Indeed, research shows generally little support for compensating differentials for working conditions other than fatality or injury risk. The
general failure to ﬁnd compensating diﬀerentials for work characteristics other than risk has bearing on whether compensating diﬀerentials
are likely to explain a substantial share of the gender pay disparity.
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Table 7.1 gives an overview of occupational fatalities and causes by
sex. Job fatalities are quite rare events, with an all-worker fatality rate
of 4.1 per 100,000 workers in 2004. Women comprise only 7.2 percent
of the total fatalities. Relative to men, women are disproportionately
more likely to die on the job from assault or violent act.
Table 7.2 reports the number of nonfatal occupational injuries and
the corresponding female share. Nonfatal injuries are fairly common,
with an overall incidence rate of 4.8 cases per 100 equivalent full-time
workers in 2004. In contrast to fatalities, women are considerably more
likely to suﬀer nonfatal injuries or illness involving days away from
work.
Flexible work schedules are an amenity that may warrant lower pay
as a compensating diﬀerential. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 provide statistics
on trends in ﬂexible schedules among full-time workers. Workers are
deﬁned as having a ﬂexible schedule if they answer yes to the CPS supplement question, “Do you have ﬂexible work hours that allow you to
vary or make changes in the time you begin and end work?” Note the
large increase in workers with a ﬂexible schedule since 1985, the year the
CPS initiated questions on ﬂexibility in schedules. Women with considerable family responsibilities would seem to prefer such schedules. Yet,
as shown in Table 7.3, men are actually more likely to have a ﬂexible
schedule. Furthermore, as shown in Table 7.4, the likelihood of having a
ﬂexible schedule is largely unrelated to the presence or age of children.
The statistics in these tables suggest that even if workers receive lower
pay for ﬂexibility, since men are more likely to have ﬂexibility in their
jobs than women, the possibility that women prefer ﬂexibility because
of family responsibilities will not translate into a substantial reduction
in the unexplained component of the pay gap.

7.2

Compensating Diﬀerentials for Fatality or Injury Risk

There is extensive evidence that women are more risk averse than are
men, which itself implies that women may have diﬀerent preferences
that result in women choosing jobs with less risk of physical injury or

Assaults and
violent acts
795
121
674
15.2

Contact with
objects and
equipment
1004
26
978
2.6
Falls
815
37
778
4.5

Exposure to
harmful substances
or environments
459
27
432
5.9

Fires and
explosions
159
10
149
6.3

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries. Available at www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cftb0202.pdf.

Total
Female
Male
Female share of total

Total fatalities
5703
411
5292
7.2

Transportation
incidents
2460
187
2273
7.6

Table 7.1 Fatal occupational injuries and event or exposure, 2004.
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Table 7.2 Nonfatal occupational injuries and illnesses involving days away from work.

Total
Female
Male
Female share
of total

Total
1,259,320
425,470
829,300
33.8

Total goods
producing
408,400
60,030
348,220
14.7

Total service producing
850,930
365,440
481,090
42.9

Median days
away from
work
7
7
8

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Workplace Injuries and Illnesses in 2004. Available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/osh2.pdf. Adapted from Tables 1 and 8.
Table 7.3 Percent with ﬂexible schedules, full-time wage and salary workers, selected years.

Female
Male
F/M %

May 1985

May 1997

May 2004

11.3
13.1
86.3

26.2
28.6
91.6

26.7
28.1
95.0

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Workers in Flexible and Shift Schedules in May 2004.
Available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ﬂex.pdf. Adapted from Table A.
Table 7.4 Percent with ﬂexible schedules by age of youngest child, full-time wage and salary
workers, 2004.

Female
Male
F/M %

Youngest child under
6 years
26.4
30.2
87.4

Youngest child 6–17 years
25.5
29.1
87.6

None under 18 years
27.1
27.1
100.0

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Workers in Flexible and Shift Schedules in May 2004.
Available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ﬂex.pdf. Adapted from Table 1.

death. Using data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey
(NMES), Hersch (1996) shows that women make safer health choices
than men with respect to smoking, wearing a seatbelt, ﬂossing, brushing
teeth, and checking blood pressure. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998)
ﬁnd evidence that women are more risk averse than men in their ﬁnancial decisions using data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances.
DeLeire and Levy (2004) estimate conditional logit models of occupational choice at the two-digit level, showing that greater fatality risk
deters employment in risky occupations for women more than for men,
and that single parents, both male and female, are less likely to sort
into risky jobs.
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Until recently, job risk measures were available only at the industry level, hence there was no way to distinguish between risks faced
by, say, male miners and female oﬃce workers in the mining industry.
This measurement error led most researchers who assumed women were
employed in safe jobs to exclude female workers from any analysis of
compensating diﬀerentials for injury or death risk, as estimates based
on samples including women failed to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant wage–risk premium. In 1993 the BLS began recording gender, occupation, and age
range associated with fatalities and nonfatal injuries. Using these newly
available data, Hersch (1998) reports that adjusted for diﬀerences in
labor supply, women are 76 percent as likely as men to have a lost
workday injury. Within white-collar occupations, the injury rate for
women is 80 percent higher than for men. Furthermore, women receive
a substantial compensating diﬀerential for gender-speciﬁc job risk, of
a magnitude similar to blue-collar men. In contrast, there is almost no
evidence that white-collar men receive a compensating diﬀerential for
job risk. Thus, inclusion of job injury risk will not narrow the explained
share of the gender pay gap but may instead increase it.
Leeth and Ruser (2003) perform an analysis similar to Hersch (1998)
by race as well as by gender, adding to the wage equation genderspeciﬁc and race-speciﬁc fatality rates as well as injury rates, matched
by three-digit occupation. Using data for 1996–1998, they ﬁnd that men
receive a premium for fatality risk. There is inconsistent or insigniﬁcant
evidence that women also receive a premium for fatality risk. Both
male and female workers receive a wage premium for nonfatal injury
risk, with the premium substantially higher for women. Neither male
nor female workers receive a premium for risk of death in white-collar
jobs, and although there is some evidence that males in blue-collar
jobs receive a premium for fatality risk, there is only weak evidence
that females in blue-collar jobs do as well.

7.3

Compensating Diﬀerentials for Working Conditions
Other Than Risk

Refer again to a general wage equation,
ln Wit = Xit β + HWit γ + Jt α + uit ,

(7.1)
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where W represents the log of the real hourly wage of individual i
at time t, X is a vector of human capital characteristics, and HW is
time spent on household activities and may be measured as total time
over some period, or on weekdays and weekends, or divided into time
spent on speciﬁc types of activities, such as cleaning and yard work. J
is a vector of job attributes that may warrant a compensating diﬀerential. Time spent on housework is explicitly introduced to recognize
that men and women may have diﬀerent preferences over working conditions because of diﬀerences in household responsibilities. The ﬁxed
eﬀects and IV results of Hersch and Stratton (1997) imply that the
error term in this equation is not correlated with the explanatory variables, hence we assume here that the error term uit is random and
OLS estimation is appropriate. OLS is also the predominant method
of estimation throughout the literature.
The speciﬁcation above allows us to examine whether the estimated inverse housework–wage relation arises from failure to control
for working conditions. The only paper that examines both the role
of housework and working conditions is Hersch (1991c). Hersch uses
self-collected data from a sample of manufacturing workers who report
information on housework and childcare time, working conditions, and
job eﬀort, as well as on wages and human capital characteristics. The
housework and childcare questions request respondents to report how
much time they spent separately on housework and on childcare on
both job days and non-job days. Respondents report the nonpecuniary
characteristics of their jobs, such as whether they are exposed to unsafe
working conditions or bad weather, whether their job requires physical
exertion, and whether their job allows for individual discretion over
how to perform the job and whether the job is repetitive or stressful.
The working conditions provided by this study have the considerable
advantage of being individual-speciﬁc rather than imputed from industry or occupational means (such as the DOT), which is the method
most widely used to measure working conditions (e.g., Macpherson and
Hirsch, 1995).
In contrast to the literature of the time, Hersch’s (1991c) wage analysis indicates substantial evidence of compensating diﬀerentials for a
wide range of working conditions. Wages are higher for those with more
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decision-making authority and freedom to decide how to work, as well
as for those with more job stress. Repetitive jobs are associated with
lower pay, reﬂecting the lesser mental demands of such work. Inclusion
of working conditions substantially increases the explanatory power of
the wage equations. Yet inclusion of working conditions did not unambiguously reduce the unexplained wage gap between men and women.1
Furthermore, the eﬀect of housework on wages, as well as the eﬀect
of children on wages, is altered only slightly by the inclusion of working conditions in the equation, suggesting that any correlation between
household responsibilities and working conditions is minor.
Flexible schedules would seem to be a desirable working condition
warranting lower pay as a compensating diﬀerential. But oﬀsetting any
negative wage eﬀect is the possibility that ﬂexibility makes workers
more productive. Gariety and Shaﬀer (2001) use CPS data on ﬂexible
schedules reported in supplements in 1989 and 1997 to estimate wage
equations controlling for whether a worker has a ﬂexible schedule, as
well as controlling for the reason such as transportation or because of
family and child responsibilities. The evidence does not provide evidence that ﬂexibility is a job beneﬁt warranting lower pay for women.
In both years women receive a positive wage premium for ﬂexibility, as
did men in the second year of data. Women’s preference for jobs with
greater ﬂexibility, therefore, cannot explain the gender pay disparity.

1 There

is an increase in the explained component using the female coeﬃcients but not the
male coeﬃcients.

8
Diﬀerences in Content of Education

Education is a key human capital investment. Although questions
remain about whether education enhances productivity or signals that
an individual has greater innate ability, regression analyses invariably
show that education has a positive and substantial eﬀect on earnings.
In contrast to years of work experience, there has long been little disparity in educational achievement by sex, or if any, women have had
an edge. Women have been more likely to be high school graduates,
and in recent years more women than men have earned bachelor’s
degrees, with men somewhat but not dramatically more likely than
women to earn graduate degrees. For example, in 2001–2002, women
were awarded 57.4 percent of bachelor’s degrees, 46.3 percent of doctorates, and 47.3 percent of ﬁrst professional degrees.1 In wage decompositions, with little diﬀerence in average years of education between
men and women, even greatly larger returns to education for men will
have a small impact on explaining gender disparities in pay.
However, men and women have tended to have very diﬀerent majors in
college, and even in high school acquire diﬀerent schooling. In particular,
1 U.S.

Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, Fall 2002, Tables 265, 271, and 274.
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there is evidence that returns to mathematical and scientiﬁc education
are higher than in other disciplines, and women have been underrepresented in these disciplines. There are several possible reasons why men
and women may choose diﬀerent majors. Individuals choose majors by
comparing costs and beneﬁts. Expectations of intermittent labor force
participation would reduce the beneﬁts of ﬁelds, such as science, that
require substantial on the job training or have a high rate of depreciation
of knowledge.2 As the tables below show, the gender disparity in ﬁelds has
narrowed over time, and if noncontinuous participation is a primary reason for the gender disparity in majors, the gap should narrow even more
as women are in the labor force more continuously.
Another possibility is that women have lower ability in male disciplines or diﬀer in preferences so that they choose traditionally female
disciplines. Greater ability in the major will lower the costs of investment, so those with mathematics aptitude should major in more quantitative ﬁelds. The average math SAT score among boys is higher than
the average score for girls by about 50 points, although boys and girls
have similar verbal SAT scores. As the studies discussed below show,
however, controlling for standardized tests scores does not eliminate
the unexplained gender disparity in either choice of majors or earnings.
Still another possibility is that certain predominantly male majors are
unfriendly enough to women that even entry is limited by discrimination. A related reason is that the returns to ﬁelds may be lower for
women in predominantly male ﬁelds than for men in the same ﬁelds.

8.1

Trends in Educational Attainment and College Majors

Table 8.1 shows the educational attainment among those in the labor
force in 1970 and 2004. College educated workers were the minority of
the labor force in 1970. Women in the labor force at that time were
less likely than men to have a college degree, but were more likely to be
a high school graduate. By 2004, few labor force participants are not
high school graduates, and a greater share of women than men have at
least some college or are college graduates.
2 An

example given by Turner and Bowen (1999) is that knowledge of Shakespeare may provide more opportunities than knowledge of the nearly obsolete software program Cobol.
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Table 8.1 Percent distribution of highest educational attainment of labor force 25–64 years
of age, 1970 and 2004.
Less than 4 years
high school/less
than high school
diploma

4 years high
school/high
school
graduate

Some college
and associate
degree

4 years or more
college/college
graduates and higher
degrees

1970
Female
Male

33.5
37.5

44.3
34.5

10.9
12.2

11.2
15.7

2004
Female
Male

7.7
11.5

29.4
30.7

30.2
25.6

32.6
32.3

Note: The CPS educational category deﬁnitions were changed in 1992.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Women in the Labor Force: A Databook (2005). Adapted
from Table 9.
Table 8.2 Women’s earnings as a percent of men’s, median usual weekly earnings of full-time
wage and salary workers 25 years and over by educational attainment.

Total
Less than high school diploma
High school graduate
Some college or associate degree
Bachelor’s degree or higher

1979

1980

1990

2000

2004

62.1
60.2
60.0
64.0
66.6

62.7
61.3
61.3
64.5
67.8

72.1
68.8
68.6
72.8
72.2

74.5
74.9
71.2
73.1
74.1

78.7
74.9
75.6
75.8
75.2

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2004 (2005).
Adapted from Table 14.

Table 8.2 shows women’s earnings as a percent of men’s with the
same education for selected years from 1979 to 2004. By 2004 there is
little diﬀerence by education in the female to male earnings ratio. In
fact, relative wage growth has been the slowest for women with college
degrees or higher between 1979 and 2004.
Table 8.3 reports the average verbal and math SAT scores for males
and females entering college classes in the years 1970, 1980, 1990,
and 2002. Verbal scores are similar for males and females. Female
math scores are on average below the male scores, ranging from 92
to 94 percent of average male scores. Why women have lower average
SAT scores is not fully understood, but it is worthwhile noting that
more women than men attend college so in part the average scores may
reﬂect inclusion of a greater share nonmathematical-oriented collegebound females than males.
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Table 8.3 Average SAT scores of entering college classes, selected years.
1970

1980

1990

2002

Verbal (all)
Female
Male
F/M %

537
538
536
100.4

502
498
506
98.4

500
496
505
98.2

504
502
507
99.0

Math (all)
Female
Male
F/M %

512
493
531
92.8

492
473
515
91.8

501
483
521
92.7

516
500
534
93.6

Source: The College Board, available at www.collegeboard.com/prod downloads/about/
news info/cbsenior/yr2002/pdf/table2.pdf.
Table 8.4 Number of earned degrees by level of degree, selected years.
1969–1970

1979–1980

1989–1990

1999–2000

Associate degrees total
Female
Male
Female percent of total

206,023
88,591
117,432
43.0

400,910
217,173
183,737
54.2

455,102
263,907
191,195
58.0

564,933
340,212
224,721
60.2

Bachelor’s degrees total
Female
Male
Female percent of total

792,316
341,219
451,097
43.1

929,417
455,806
473,611
49.0

1,051,344
559,648
491,696
53.2

1,237,875
707,508
530,367
57.2

Master’s degrees total
Female
Male
Female percent of total

208,291
82,667
125,624
39.7

298,081
147,332
150,749
49.4

324,301
170,648
153,653
52.6

457,056
265,264
191,792
58.0

First-professional degrees total
Female
Male
Female percent of total

34,918
1,841
33,077
5.3

70,131
17,415
52,716
24.8

70,988
27,027
43,961
38.1

80,057
35,818
44,239
44.7

Doctor’s degrees total
Female
Male
Female percent of total

29,866
3,976
25,890
13.3

32,615
9,672
22,943
29.7

38,371
13,970
24,401
36.4

44,808
19,780
25,028
44.1

Source: U.S. Department of Education, Digest of Education Statistics 2003. Adapted from
Table 249. Doctor’s degrees include Ph.D., Ed.D., and comparable degrees at the doctoral
level, and excludes ﬁrst-professional such as M.D., D.D.S., and law degrees.

Table 8.4 shows the trend in female share of degrees over the years
1969–1970 to 1999–2000. Women received somewhat fewer than half
of the associate, bachelor’s, and master’s degrees in 1969–1970, and
somewhat more than half of these degrees by 1999–2000. Most dramatic
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is the large upsurge in the share of women receiving professional degrees
and doctorates. In 1969–1970, only 5 percent of professional degrees
and 13 percent of doctorates were awarded to women. By 1999–2000,
45 percent of professional degrees and 44 percent of doctorates were
awarded to women.
Table 8.5 shows trends in degrees by ﬁeld over the period 1970–
1971 and 2001–2002. Over the 30-year period, business moved from
being an almost exclusively male major to one in which half of the
bachelor’s degrees are awarded to women. Psychology, education and
health professions and related sciences have long been popular among
female students, and while there is little trend among women in education or in health professions, psychology moved from a ﬁeld in which
fewer than half of the degrees were awarded to women to one in which
women are awarded the majority of the degrees at all levels. Despite
women’s lower average math SAT scores, a large share of mathematics majors are female, with the rise in the female share of doctorates
most notable. Even engineering, long a male stronghold, has experienced a large increase in the share of female majors, going from nearly
nonexistent in 1970 to about one in ﬁve by 2001.

8.2

Choice of College Major and Eﬀects on the Pay Gap

In an early study of sex diﬀerences in choice of college major,
Polachek (1978) posits a human capital investment model that implies
that women select college majors with lower penalties to labor force
intermittency. Polachek uses data from two sources: Explorations in
Equality of Opportunity 1955–1970, a sample of high school sophomores surveyed in 1955 and resurveyed in 1970, and the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS72), a sample
who were surveyed as college freshman in 1973. Polachek examines
the choice of college major controlling for a variety of characteristics
including aptitude measured by standardized test scores, courses taken
in high school, and parents’ education, as well as extensive attitudinal
or preference characteristics, such as whether the respondent attended
college because college graduates earn more, in order to develop socially,
to marry well, and so forth. Majors are grouped in nine standard
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Table 8.5 Number of earned degrees by selected ﬁelds and female share of total, 1970–1971
and 2001–2002.
1970–1971

Business
Female
Male
Female share
Computer and
information
sciences
Female
Male
Female share

2001–2002

Bachelor’s Master’s Doctor’s
degrees
degrees degrees
114,729
25,977
757
10,454
1,010
21
104,275
24,967
736
9.1
3.9
2.8

Bachelor’s Master’s
degrees
degrees
281,330
120,785
140,764
49,628
140,566
71,157
50.0
41.1

Doctor’s
degrees
1,158
410
748
35.4

2,388

1,588

128

47,299

16,113

750

324
2,064
13.6

164
1,424
10.3

3
125
2.3

13,051
34,248
27.6

5,360
10,753
33.3

171
579
22.8

Education
Female
Male
Female share

176,307
131,411
44,896
74.5

87,666
49,301
38,365
56.2

6,041
1,270
4,771
21.0

106,383
82,332
24,051
77.4

136,579
104,407
32,172
76.4

6,967
4,632
2,335
66.5

Engineering
Female
Male
Female share

50,046
400
49,646
0.8

16,443
185
16,258
1.1

3,638
23
3,615
0.05

73,964
13,974
59,990
18.9

26,920
5,753
21,167
21.4

5,210
900
4,310
17.3

Health professions
and related
sciences
Female
Male
Female share

25,226

5,749

466

70,517

43,644

3,523

19,438
5,788
77.1

3,182
2,567
55.3

77
389
16.5

60,260
10,257
85.5

33,847
9,797
77.6

2,230
1,293
63.3

Mathematics
Female
Male
Female share

24,937
9,439
15,498
37.9

5,695
1,546
4,149
27.1

1,249
95
1,154
7.6

12,395
5,787
6,608
46.7

3,487
1,478
2,009
42.4

958
278
680
29.0

Psychology
Female
Male
Female share

38,187
16,960
21,227
44.4

5,717
2,322
3,395
40.6

2,144
515
1,629
24.0

76,671
59,396
17,275
77.5

14,888
11,371
3,517
76.4

4,341
2,962
1,379
68.2

Source: U.S. Department of Education, Digest of Education Statistics 2003. Adapted from
Tables 280, 282, 283, 284, 289, 290, 293.
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categories (e.g., business, education, and engineering) and choice of
major is estimated by multivariate logit. The results accord with expectations, showing that those with greater quantitative ability are more
likely to major in math, science, or engineering relative to humanities.
While one might expect that such extensive controls for background
and preferences would result in an insigniﬁcant eﬀect of sex on choice
of major, Polachek does not ﬁnd this to be the case. However, the
unexplained eﬀect of sex on choice of college major declines somewhat
between the ﬁrst period in the 1950s and the second period in the 1970s.
Additional information on the importance of standardized tests on
choice of major is provided by Turner and Bowen (1999), who use
data on all students entering twelve selective colleges in 1951, 1976,
and 1989 in the College and Beyond data set. Turner and Bowen show
that even women with high math SAT scores are more likely than men
to choose nonquantitative majors such as life sciences and humanities
than engineering, math, and physical sciences. Diﬀerences in SAT scores
vary by major, but overall account for less than half the gender gap in
choice of major and explain much less of the disparity in economics and
psychology. Furthermore, the gap between men and women in choice
of majors did not shrink between 1976 and 1989, and in fact rose in
psychology and life sciences.
Salaries vary considerably by college major. Of interest is whether a
gender pay disparity remains after controlling for major. Studies have
used individual data as well as aggregated data on recently hired college
graduates.
Brown and Corcoran (1997) show that college major explains a
considerable component of the pay disparity among college graduates,
but content of coursework does not explain diﬀerences among those
with high school degrees or with some college. Among college graduates,
including college major in addition to measures of experience raises
the explained component of the 1984 pay disparity from about half to
two-thirds in analyses based on Survey of Income Program Participants
(SIPP) data. Corresponding calculations for college graduates from the
NLS72 in the 1986 follow-up raises the explained component to over
half from 20 percent. The age range in the SIPP is unrestricted, and
those in the NLS72 are all in their early 30s when resurveyed in 1986.
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Based on the NLS72 data, Brown and Corcoran ﬁnd that women
college graduates receive a higher return than men in humanities and
engineering and a lower return in biology, math, and physical sciences.
Also of interest is their ﬁnding that controlling for high school test
scores as measures of ability contributes nothing to the explained gender pay diﬀerential. Furthermore, among those who are not college
graduates, controlling for speciﬁc high school courses or major when
attended college accounts for no diﬀerence, or at most a small diﬀerence, in the gender pay disparity. Since only one-third of those in the
labor market are college graduates, this suggests that despite gender
diﬀerences in high school course work, such diﬀerences are not important determinants of the pay disparity, a point further supported by
the ﬁnding that a considerable unexplained gap remains even after controlling for college major among college graduates.
Instead of analyzing individual data, Paglin and Rufolo (1990)
compare starting salary oﬀers by majors with mean GRE scores in
that major. The GRE quantitative score (GRE-Q) is highly positively
correlated with starting salary oﬀers reported by the College Placement Council (now called the National Association of Colleges and
Employers). The GRE verbal score is not correlated with starting
salary oﬀers. Paglin and Rufolo present descriptive statistics showing a skewed distribution of GRE-Q by sex, with women in lower
GRE-Q ranges. Assuming that students select into majors in which
they have a comparative advantage, Paglin and Rufolo interpret their
ﬁndings as showing that ﬁelds with a high proportion of women are
lower paying because these are ﬁelds in which human capital can
be produced with lesser amounts of the scarce resource of quantitative ability. Their study shows no remaining gender pay disparity
after accounting for major among new college graduates. Also using
data from the National Association of Colleges and Employers data
set, McDonald and Thornton (forthcoming) ﬁnd that college major
explains up to 95 percent of the gap in starting salary oﬀers over the
years 1974–2001.3 The data set reports average starting salaries by sex
3 McDonald

and Thornton (forthcoming) provides a valuable survey of the literature on the
role of college major in explaining the gender pay gap.
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divided into nearly 80 diﬀerent majors. However, the samples used in
these papers may not be representative, as the data are derived from
salary oﬀers made to students recruited through campus college placement centers.
Weinberger (1999) points out that disproportionately fewer women
than men were recruited through campus college placement centers,
which raises concerns about the representativeness of the samples
examined by Paglin and Rufolo (1990) and McDonald and Thornton (forthcoming). Weinberger performs an analysis similar to that of
Paglin and Rufolo using data from the 1985 Survey of Recent College
Graduates who are age 30 or younger. Controlling for college GPA and
average GRE-Q by graduates in the major, Weinberger ﬁnds that a
9 percent gender pay gap remains and that the gap does not vary by
whether the major is technical or not.
In sum, despite historic diﬀerences in choices of college major and
the propensity of women to choose less quantitative majors, controlling
for college major does not eliminate the gender pay disparity.

9
Evidence on Discrimination Based on Observed
Productivity or Stock Market Response

Because it is always possible that any unexplained gap is due to diﬀerences in productivity, one potentially attractive approach would be to
compare wage disparities to productivity disparities using data reporting both individual wages and direct measures of productivity. The
advantage of such an approach is that although we know we may
have omitted productivity characteristics, such omitted characteristics should aﬀect both wages and productivity in the same manner.
Evidence showing wage disparities that are greater than productivity
disparities are consistent with discrimination.
Of course, measures of individual productivity are rare. Firm level
data can also be used to study discrimination. Using the Worker Establishment Characteristics Database (WECD), a matched employer–
employee data set of manufacturing establishments, Hellerstein
et al. (1999) compare relative marginal productivity of females and
males to relative wages. This study ﬁnds lower marginal productivity
for females than males, but larger diﬀerences in wages than in marginal
productivity, and thus suggests discrimination. Also using the WECD,
Hellerstein et al. (2002) ﬁnd that among manufacturing plants with
high product market power, those employing more women are more
348
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proﬁtable, again consistent with discrimination. Hersch (1991a) shows
that law suits, decisions, and settlements have a substantial impact on
the value of ﬁrms involved in discrimination litigation, with the drop
in ﬁrm value far greater than average direct costs of settling the case.
This suggests that such ﬁrms will be required to make costly changes
in employment practices and is thus consistent with a discriminatory
environment prior to litigation.
In the following I discuss several studies which have information on
actual productivity as well as on earnings. Although such information
is available only in narrow occupations, which necessarily limits generality, such studies add important information to understanding pay
disparities.
One notable study that examines discrimination in hiring is by
Goldin and Rouse (2000). Many orchestras started using blind auditions in the 1970s and 1980s, in which the auditioning musician would
perform behind a screen. Goldin and Rouse ﬁnd that the share of female
musicians in a set of nine orchestras rose from about 10 percent in 1970
to about 20 percent in 1990. After accounting for general increases in
women’s labor force participation and in the share of women studying at leading music schools, as well as individual ﬁxed eﬀects feasible
because individual musicians audition for multiple orchestras, Goldin
and Rouse ﬁnd somewhat mixed evidence but overall conclude that
the use of screens reduces discrimination against women in orchestra
hiring.
There have been many studies examining discrimination in
academia. Although actual productivity embodies more than publications, publication productivity is reported in a number of data sets
on academics and is doubtlessly an important determinant of earnings.
For the most part, research shows little gender diﬀerence in pay within
rank, but considerable diﬀerences in promotion from assistant to associate professor.
One recent example is by Ginther and Hayes (2003). This paper
uses data from the Survey of Doctorate Recipients on academics with
doctorates in the humanities in the 1977–1995 waves. The survey
provides information on demographic characteristics, educational background, primary work activity, employer characteristics, and salary.
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They analyze a cross-sectional sample of full-time tenured or tenure
track faculty as well as a longitudinal sample. Salary diﬀerences are
explained by diﬀerences in rank, but there are gender diﬀerences in promotion to tenure (probability and duration) controlling for experience,
children, career employment patterns, ﬁeld of study, and publications.
Although the presence of children has a negative eﬀect on promotion
probability and duration, performing the counterfactual that women
have no children has only a small eﬀect on promotion probability and
duration. There is also little support for a productivity diﬀerence by
sex, as there is little diﬀerence in publication output, and the coeﬃcients on publications are more favorable to women.
Smith (2002) examines diﬀerences among veterinarians in pay and
in productivity, using data from annual wage surveys conducted in 1994
and 1995 for Veterinary Economics.1 The sample includes veterinarians who report full-time employment as a private practice veterinarian
and have at least one year of experience. The usual track for veterinarians is to start as employees of a practice before forming higherpaying partnerships or choosing self-employment. Female veterinarians
are younger with about half the average work experience as male veterinarians, although there is little diﬀerence in hours worked per week.
The unadjusted wage disparity among wage and salary veterinarians is
15 percent.
Of particular value of the Veterinary Economics salary survey is
unique information on actual productivity (measured by annual revenue
produced by each individual veterinarian, which equals the amount
billed out by each individual vet for his or her practice), as well as the
number of patients seen per hour. Smith ﬁnds a pay gap larger than
the productivity gap. In fact, females actually have a greater increase
in revenue per additional patient than do men, and the coeﬃcients in
the revenue equations show that women’s measured characteristics are
more favorable to producing revenue than are men’s. In short, female
veterinarians are not less productive than are male veterinarians, yet,
nonetheless, female wage and salary veterinarians earn less than male.
1 Veterinary

Economics is a practitioner journal circulated free of charge to private-practice
veterinarians on request.
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Controls for direct measures of productivity (patients per hour, revenue
produced) have little eﬀect on the gap.
There is a substantial literature examining racial discrimination
using professional athletes. Professional sports provide an attractive
arena to examine discrimination because measures of productivity as
well as salary are available. But such research generally is limited to
examining race or ethnic gaps between productivity and salary, as
most professional sports do not involve men and women competing
in the same events. Thoroughbred horse racing is the only major professional sport in which men and women compete in the same events.
Ray and Grimes (1993) examine whether female jockeys are less likely
to have the opportunity to compete in races with bigger prizes, controlling for productivity as measured by win record as well as for age and
apprenticeship status. They ﬁnd that female jockeys secured 48 percent
fewer stakes race mounts than male jockeys. Controlling for number of
mounts as well as for win record, male jockeys with better win records
earn more, but winnings of female jockeys is unaﬀected by their win
record. This ﬁnding suggests that female jockeys are not competing
against men in high-stake races and is consistent with discrimination
against female jockeys in entry to higher purse races.

10
Concluding Comments

Women earn less than men, and no matter how extensively regressions control for market characteristics, working conditions, individual
characteristics, children, housework time, and observed productivity,
an unexplained gender pay gap remains for all but the most inexperienced of workers. If the unexplained pay disparity sometimes favored
women and sometimes favored men, there would be no reason for concern. Unexplained residuals are a fact of life in regression analysis.
But systematically and without exception ﬁnding that women earn
less than men raises some questions. What unobserved something is it
that cannot be measured, is correlated with sex, and explains more of
a pay disparity than known determinants of earnings such as education and experience? Coupled with recent class action sex discrimination litigation involving the securities industry, grocery stores, and now
Wal-Mart, it is hard to continue to attribute the remaining disparity to
unmeasurables and intangibles like eﬀort and motivation and to ignore
the possibility that discrimination remains a factor in the gender pay
disparity.
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